

The Pillars of European Cooperation

R. James Ferguson

The European Union/New Europe

Comentarios y sugerencias:

vake_diplomatic@mexicodiplomatico.org

Topics: -

- 1. The Historical Context for the New Europe*
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1. The Historical Context for the New Europe

It is impossible to understand how **revolutionary** the period 1987-2004 has been for Europe without some sense of the system which has been largely destroyed or modified during the last decade. Furthermore, any analysis of Europe needs to look at its **role in world affairs**, and to be aware of new relationships emerging among Europe, America, Russia, Africa, the Middle East and Asia (see Lundestad 2003; Thomas 2000; Silva 1990; Jordan 1991; Thurow 1992).

The subject will open up these themes with the **lecture program**. The main lecturer is Dr R. James Ferguson (Ph 55 952520, email: james_ferguson@bond.edu.au), with guest lecturers Dr Rosita Dellios and Jill Margerison, who will conduct their guest lectures through weeks 2-4. Undergraduate seminar and tutoring help is provided by the Adjunct Teaching Fellow, Alica Kizeková (akizekova@optusnet.com.au – phone number to be advised).

The updated lecture timetable is as follows: -

- 1. Introduction: The Pillars of European Cooperation**
- 2. The Maastricht Treaty and Beyond: The Drivers of European Union**
- 3. Convergence and Divergence in an Expanding New Europe**
- 4. ‘Small and Medium’ State Perspectives: Spain and Mediterranean Initiatives**
- 5. The Impact of Russian Reform**
- 6. The New Germany - Transforming the European Landscape**
- 7. The French Perspective on European and Global Affairs**

8. The United Kingdom: Atlantic and European Orientations

9. The European Search for Peace and Security

10. Bosnia to Macedonia: Reconstruction and Governance in the Balkans

11. Emerging Trends in EU Foreign Policy: Cooperative or Competitive Diplomacy?

12. Conclusions-Not-Yet-Reached: Europe in the Global System

Many of the recent changes the wider European landscape had their roots in events that emerged out of World War II and the Cold War. **Six factors** set in place between 1945 and 1950 prefigured the pattern of postwar Europe: -

A. The first development was the strained nature of the **relationship between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union** over the future of Eastern Europe and more particularly Germany. The USSR had created a buffer zone to protect her home territory from any future external threat, and was absolutely convinced that Germany must remain divided. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this theme re-emerged with Russian concern over the expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) into Eastern Europe. In 1999, tension concerning the NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia deepened Russian suspicion to the level where a 'Cold Peace' seemed in place and new Cold War is possible (see Antonenko 1999). Through early 2001, Russia remained suspicious that her security were are not being adequately taken into account either by NATO or the United States. With events after September 2001, Russia under the leadership of President Putin moved towards a more cooperative security understanding with the U.S., leading to improved relations with NATO through 2002-2004. In spite of tensions over U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both Russia and the U.S. agreed in May 2002 to further reductions of their nuclear arsenals (for alternative notions of nuclear security, see Krepon 2001). The **future relationship between Russia and Europe**, however, will continue to be a major shaper of the wider European landscape, both in terms of economic and political relations with the EU, and in terms of ongoing adjustment to security and defence policies (discussed in later lectures). Russia has made a big for return to a regional leadership role, with strong foreign policy statements in the 2000-2003 period, including criticism of the war on Iraq. President Putin's 'state-of-nation' address in May 2003 aimed return to great power status and high economic growth over the next 10 years, setting a very ambitious agenda, including to further 'integrate into Europe' (Gorshkov 2003). Likewise, Russia now has over 40% of its trade directed into Europe, and is set to remain a major supplier of energy into Europe, particularly natural gas, with new pipelines running through Ukraine, engaging Europe and the Russian zone in a complex debate over governance of energy resources (to be discussed further in lecture 5).

B. A second factor was the **reconstruction of Europe** after the end of World War II. Germany's plight - the massive damage of sustained war demanded immediate action by the Allies to stabilise civil administration, create an effective government and rebuild a viable society. All of Western Europe was drastically damaged by the war, and in need of the American aid which from 1948 was provided by the Marshall Plan

(properly called the *European Recovery Program*). This was one of the **foundation stones of the future strong relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe**. Few would have predicted how successful this reconstruction would be, leading to a very strong German national economy and to the EU as a virtual economic 'superpower'. Maintaining this economic vitality, however, remains a major challenge for Europe, and some would argue that a new shift towards a truly globalised, information economy is needed if Europe is to remain a strong force in the world economy (see Prodi 2000). Likewise, new tensions in agricultural competition and different diplomatic visions of global governance have placed serious strains on this relationship through 2003-2004, leading some to suggest a new 'post-Atlanticist' phase for Europe, a factor which puts particular strains on the United Kingdom in particular (see Lundestad 2003; Ryan 2003).

C. A third trend was created by the draft Charter of the **United Nations**, signed by fifty one states at the San Francisco Conference of April-June 1945 which increased interest in cooperative approaches. In particular the aim was to stop future world wars, especially after the development of nuclear weapons. Through the creation of a General Assembly with equal rights, voting power, and recognition were accorded all full member states (as distinct from arrangements in the Security Council). At the same time it must be stressed that this was a *United Nations*, with power invested in the nation-state rather than other groups. Likewise, the permanent members of the Security Council, who had the veto on its actions, were in fact a 'victors' club' comprised of the US, USSR., Britain, France and China (then Nationalist China). Questions of the representativeness and legitimacy of the UN have plagued its operations ever since. These issues were brought to prominence again by the limited effectiveness of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s until the intervention of NATO, and the current debate over what role the UN should have in Iraq. This meant that Western Europe has had to turn more strongly to its own economic, diplomatic and military resources to stabilise regions to the East, Southeast and South. In essence, this means that the UN has not been the pre-eminent organisation through the 1990s for the organisation of the European environment, though UN resolutions have had some role in legitimating its actions. As we shall see, **the EU (and its institutions), NATO, and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe)** have had crucial role in shaping a secure and expanding Europe. Recent debates on the viability of the UNSC through 2003-2004 have intensified this debate (We will turn to this in more detail later in the subject).

D. The discovery at the end of World War II of the concentration camps and the revelations about the mass murder of civilians meant that **human rights became a crucial issue for Western Europe**, and enshrined the *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, of 1948. These revelations would also reveal the horrors of war in a way which would drive many nations to seek inviolability, and where possible, to ensure that conflicts would not be fought on their home territory. These views particularly influenced France, USSR, U.S., and Japan. When Stalin's totalitarian methods in the USSR were ultimately revealed from the early 1950s, this would also polarise the divide between Western Europe and the communist bloc. European politicians generally aimed to avoid wars and humanitarian disasters, once again highlighting the alarm at reports of ethnic cleansing and concentration camps in former Yugoslavia during the 1992-1999 period. These problems have been highlighted again in 1997-2004 with the difficulties in bringing those suspected of 'crimes against humanity'

before international tribunals (for early criticisms, see Andrews 1997). Progress in this area was symbolised by the arrest and trial of former Yugoslavian leader *Milosevic* through 2001. These concerns have led to Europe as a whole being very concerned with different patterns of governance, and with a sustained effort to stabilise parts of Southeastern Europe. International terrorism and ongoing instability in the Middle East are also of direct concern to European security, and are one major forcing influencing its foreign policy. As issue of ongoing concern in the post-2001 period has been the degree to which human rights might indirectly be abridged by the so-called 'war on terror', and the level of intelligence needed to head off this transnational threat.

E. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented a break with fundamental traditions about the nature of war. **Conventional warfare had been one of the major tools of European international politics** and non-nuclear war was actively considered as an option in international conflict (see Kaiser 1990; Kissinger 1994). But the risks were now much greater, and after 1949 (when the Soviets tested their own first nuclear weapon) the possibility of a **nuclear war** made the conduct of wars in Europe a much more dangerous exercise. In the 1950s this was rapidly expanded into the threat of a global scale conflict using long-range bombers and missiles. Today Europe has four nuclear powers in its region: the U.S. forces and their umbrella that stretches over the NATO area, and the nuclear forces of Britain, France and Russia. Ukraine has since largely dismantled its nuclear capability (inherited through the former USSR). In fact, the issue of appropriate nuclear policies remains hotly debated in Europe, as does the issue of National Missile Defence and the status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (see Tertrais 1999; Yost 1999). As nuclear force levels have been steadily reduced, and the Cold War has ended, some would argue that nuclear elephants are dangerous white elephants that are little use in an age of new security concerns (terrorism, resource wars, humanitarian intervention, conflicts driven by nationalism etc.). However, others, including the U.S. Bush administration, would argue that a reduced but real nuclear deterrent is needed both to keep power balances among existing nuclear states, but also to deter those who might use other weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical), including the so-called 'rogue states'. Likewise, the U.S. has continued to deploy a ballistic missile defence system through its Missile Defense Agency, with defensive capabilities beginning to come on line through late 2004 (*Strategic Comments* 2004a). In Europe, a vigorous debate continues about the proper place of nuclear weapons, with UK and France committed to a limited but ongoing nuclear capability, while Germany remains highly concerned about the role of these nuclear 'umbrellas'.

F. **These factors led to a profound re-thinking of the international system as it operated within Europe.** World War II was perceived as a catastrophe by many Europeans, one that had **discredited the old order if not the old system of international diplomacy.** **Alliances, balance of power** and even **neutrality** seemed ineffective ways of guaranteeing a nation's existence within the wider Europe scene. French, American and British losses had been high, but central and eastern Europe had been devastated. Poland lost some 20% of its population and Yugoslavia 10%. Soviet losses were estimated around 20 million dead (with recent estimates going as high as 29 million). Hardly a major European city had escaped unscathed. Places like Warsaw and Berlin had to be completely rebuilt. Most major European cities were damaged to a serious degree, e.g. London. The war had been fought across much of

Europe - including Poland and Russia, Yugoslavia and Greece, Italy, northern France, Holland and Belgium.

To some degree, **the absolute insistence on sovereignty and on sovereign rights had generated these conflicts**. Perhaps the nation-state, with its drive for power and self-preservation, was at fault. Systems of diplomacy and balances of power had provided far from satisfactory methods of avoiding large-scale conflicts. It is in this experience which led to **the idea of a co-operative Europe** (not the notion of a unified Europe as conceived by Napoleon and Hitler) that the new Europe would be born. Europe, which had been the birth-place of the nation-state (where state power and the interests of the mass populations coalesce around a geographical entity), was also one of the first regions to experience the limitations of nation-states without some effective supranational system of co-ordination. It was this political need, along with the economic benefits, that saw the **birth of the idea of a formal European community**, first symbolised by the creation of the very limited integration of the *European Coal and Steel Community* in 1952 (we will look at the evolution of the European Union in some detail later in Week 2). Economic cooperation and trade benefits would be followed by diplomatic cooperation and then the reduction of security threats, a model strongly developed by France and Germany from the early 1950s (see further Marks & Steenbergen 2003; Rosamund 2000).

Europe has radically changed during the period 1992-2004. From the perspectives of 1989, Europe since the end of World War II appeared to be locked in the **confrontation set by the meeting of two spheres of the influence**: the Soviet sphere and the sphere controlled by America and the victorious European allies. This division was confirmed by the two important diplomatic conferences towards the end of the war - held at Yalta (in the Crimea) and Potsdam (Germany). These agreements **divided Europe into a Western and an Eastern zone**. To the west lay multi-party, capitalist democracies based on the 'Western' models, supported by the United States. To the east centrally-planned communist states based on the Soviet model prevailed. Each system was opposed to the other on political, economic, and philosophical grounds. With tensions escalating between 1946 and 1949, the possibility of another World War being sparked off in Europe seemed a real possibility. Both blocs created alliance systems. For the West this was NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), for the east the Warsaw Pact (see Holden 1989; see Baumann 1987). Along the dividing line running between them and right down the middle of Germany millions of soldiers, surveillance and fortification systems were put into place. It was a **bipolar world**, with two major power systems in conflict across European frontiers.

This confrontation, though it did not erupt in a major war in Europe, did fuel numerous proxy wars throughout the 'third world': conflicts in Africa, Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan were exacerbated in the light of this bipolar system, with China generally allied to the communist ideology, though often at odds with the 'hegemony' of the Soviet Union. This was the **Cold War**: a form of confrontation in which there were both casualties and enormous economic costs. There were also for a time some neutral states: Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, but these existed largely in the context of a perceived balance between east and west which their neutrality would not strongly alter.

Since the time of the Roman Empire, Europe has been subjected to **forces which integrate** and draw it together, and **forces which pull apart different groups or interests** within the European system. Although **a shared European culture** had emerged to some extent through the Christendom and the Renaissance, the emergence of strong states and nations from the late Middle Ages began to pull apart any political unity. The state system gradually began to dominant after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), but did not solve the problem of national conflict (Pagden 2002, p13). This emerged in **cycles of intense warfare** from the 16th century onwards. In the late 19th and 20th centuries France and Germany have been at war three times and twice at the centre of world conflicts. One of the major themes which affects the future of Europe are **forces of convergence and divergence**, which Hugh Miall thinks are central in three possible prospects for Europe; a return to a divided Europe of nation-states, the development of a static 'Fortress Europe', or the development of a 'Wider Europe' with positive relations with countries to the East, including Russia (see Miall 1993; Miall 1994b.) Fortress Europe now seems less likely as progress in GATT and WTO processes make 'trade wars' between major economic blocs unlikely (Miall 1994b, p13), though recent concerns about immigration and employment have suggested that Europe is still concerned about the movement of peoples across its borders, leading to a shifting border as eastward enlargement expands the EU. **The EU is committed to the notion of a wider Europe**, as it begins the process of admitting new members through 2003-2004, with ten nations of Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Cyprus added in May 2004, and with Turkey's application for membership still in process. As we shall see, several other prospects exist, but largely hinge on the success or failure of the **current attempt to continue the momentum of European integration and expansion**, in spite of numerous problems and substantial opposition from within. From April 2003, **the signing of the Accession Treaty cleared the path for full membership of new states in May 2004**, including: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, while Bulgaria and Romania likely to join through 2007 (*European Report 2003b*). In the short term, of course, this **enlargement will also complicate decision-making** among its 25 members (issues currently being debated in the idea of an emerging European Constitutions), as well as **generate a greater disparity of wealth among different EU members**. (These issues will be taken up in later lectures).

2. Cooperation and Communalty

The common affairs of Western Europe post-1945 were **managed through a complex diplomatic system aimed at increasing levels of cooperation among European states** (Pagden 2002, p7). This cooperation clustered on **four main institutions**:

- 1) The **European Community** or EEC, later shortened to EC, but moving in the 1990s to a phase of political union and hence known as the EU. The **European Union was originally based on the Treaty of European Union of 1991-1992** (later trends established via Treaty of Amsterdam from 1997, the Treaty of Nice of 2001, and the Accession Treaty of 2003). Within the EU itself five institutions have key roles (*Europa 2002*; to be covered in more detail in Week 2): -

European Parliament (elected);

Council of the Union (composed of the governments of the

Member States);
European Commission (executive and administrative body);
Court of Justice;
Court of Auditors (management of the EU budget).

Other important institutions include (*Europa* 2002): -

European Economic and Social Committee (expresses the opinions of organised civil society on economic and social issues);
Committee of the Regions (expresses the opinions of regional and local authorities on regional policy, environment, and education, forming part of the idea of a Europe of the regions);
European Ombudsman (deals with complaints from citizens concerning maladministration by an EU institution or body);
European Investment Bank (contributes to EU objectives by financing public and private long-term investments);
European Central Bank (responsible for monetary policy and foreign exchange operations).

- 2) the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** or NATO, including most Western European states, plus the U.S., Canada and Turkey. NATO has already **begun to expand into Eastern Europe** from 1999 with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland gaining full membership. Through April 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have joined as new members, generating some protest from Russia over the rapid expansion of the organisation (BBC 2004). NATO has also been supplemented by moves from 1999 by the EU to create a **new European army for rapid reaction and peace-keeping roles**, the European Rapid Reaction Force, a move which remains controversial, though the force has become partially operational through early 2003, e.g. in Bosnia and Macedonia (Lungescu 2003) and through late 2003 began to set up an 'operational defence planning facility' in Brussels (*Strategic Comments* 2003). The force has become operation, but the real issue is whether it will operate in major hotspots without NATO (and de facto U.S.) support.
- 3) the **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe** (the CSCE, now the **OSCE**), originally between thirty five participant nations with the agreement had been signed at Helsinki in 1975 (see Heraclides 1993 & Mastny 1986). Since that time most states in Western Europe and Eurasia have joined;
- 4) though not formally a European institution, the summit of the leaders of the seven most industrialised nations known as the **G-8**, who meet with the President of the European Commission annually (Russian recently joined the G-7 to form the G-8, though her economic strength was limited). Although Japan is a member of the G8, the meeting is largely representative of America and leading European states (including the UK, France, Germany, and Italy).

The need for close economic cooperation within Europe was formally enshrined in the **Treaty of Paris of 1951** - this created the **European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)**. The purpose of this area of cooperation was clearly expressed in the **Schuman Declaration of May 1950**: -

The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action which must be taken in the first place must concern these two countries. The French government proposes that action be taken on *one limited but decisive point*. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within a framework open to the participation of other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe . . . The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same term, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification. (in Rosamond 2000, pp52-53).

Coal and steel, of course, were the key elements of heavy industry (as well as war production), and it was thought that **cooperation in these areas would functionally bring many related areas into coordination** (Rosamond 2000).

The EEC came into being on the 1st of January 1958. The **founder members** were France, Italy, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Governance was through a European Parliament, a Council of Ministers, a Central Commission, and a Court of Justice. The founding document - the **Rome Treaty** - envisaged immediate tariff cuts and the total abolition of customs barriers among the members by 1967. While there was **economic cooperation** in many areas the basis of its success lay in centralised planning both in an economic and in a social sense, beginning with the common agricultural policy and coal-and-steel policies. Within its first five years the EEC, covering some 165 million people, emerged as the world's largest trading bloc. It was the biggest exporter and purchaser of raw materials, the second largest importer, while its steel production was second only to that of the United States. **Several waves of accessions** (1973: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Spain and Portugal; 1995: Austria, Finland and Sweden) led to a community of 12, then 15 members (*Europa* 2002). The European Union now is currently processing the requests for membership of thirteen more members from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area, of which 10 will gain full accession through 2003-2004, and possibly another three on or after 2007 (this is a controversial issue which we will return to later)..

This growth was not an easy or trouble-free process. During the eighties certain **signs of crisis in European integration** began to emerge. Economic stagnation and scepticism concerning the future of Europe began to emerge. Economic growth reduced to a 1.5% by the early eighties. In 1983 the future of the European Community was under threat. However, both **the French and Germans realised the importance of the EC** for the future prosperity of Europe and their countries, as a mechanism reducing future European conflicts, and in the case of Germany, the only hope of finding a path towards German reunification. The idea of a strong European union was rethought in the mid-eighties, leading to the convening of an intergovernmental conference in 1990, whose submissions lead on to the **Maastricht Treaty** which paved the way for a political as well as economic union in the period 1991-1992. This process, however, was every controversial. In many countries, ratification of the treaty through referendums only barely succeeded (as in France), while in order to gain forward momentum a multi-track process was instituted whereby states could choose to be more or less integrated within some of the European accords, e.g. the movement towards European Monetary Union.

Britain has had a rather unique role to play in the European process. The UK did not join until 1972 (their first attempt had been blocked by the French ten years earlier in 1962). Secondly, British Conservatives, more particularly under Margaret Thatcher, were reluctant participants, seeing Europeanism as a threat to the independent sovereignty of Britain, to the British pound, and to divergent labour and social laws. To date, the British have been the most cautious in accepting the notion of a European Monetary Union, and have established clauses allowing them to opt out of accepting the proposed European monetary unit, the *euro*. Through late 2003, discussion began concerning the framing of a referendum that may be decided on future membership of the euro-zone (BBC 2003b). This process of caution continued as former Prime Minister John Major tried to avoid antagonising the Eurosceptics in his own party, from the 1997 election of a Labour Government, Britain has been a somewhat stronger promoter of European integration (see Sheldon 2001). Likewise, economic progress in Europe was seen as ways of moderating conflict in Northern Ireland, especially since the Irish Republic has gone through something of an economic boom during the last few years as the result of deepened access to European markets. **Through 2003-2004, Britain has been somewhat split between Europeanist and Atlanticist (US-alliance) orientations, leading to the view of the UK as 'the reluctant Europeans'**. Whether it can continue to be a moderator of tensions between the US and some European nations and agenda remains to be seen, especially in the light of splits over the functioning of the UNSC and the war in Iraq.

Before **moves could be made towards any sort of political or supranational union**, certain key aspects of the European Community had to be reformed from the mid-1980s. The first called for institutional reform of the EC's organisational structure, revamping of the European Commission, giving more power to the European Parliament, and changes to the Council of Ministers - the highest decision making body of the EC, e.g. **greater use of qualified majority voting** which allows a motion to pass with an effective support of 70% (for details, see Lodge 1993, p16). The Council of Ministers is made up of ministers of various governments meeting to make decisions relevant to their own portfolios e.g. finance ministers would decide financial questions. Hence the EU still has a **considerable component of inter-governmental structure**, as distinct from supranational organisations as the European Parliament. **This issue has become more important as the EU expands**, and finding complete consensus become more difficult with added members. This suggested the need to use qualified majority voting in more areas, and through 2001-2004 suggested that there was a need to revamp the EU system, an issue intensely debated through a major (2002-2003) public '**Convention' on the future of the European Union**, with the recommendations now being debated among European government from April 2004. Following a meeting royal palace at Laeken, (a Brussels suburb) on December 14-15, 2001, it was hoped that a revitalised path could be forged for an expanding EU: -

This should be the effect of the **Laeken Declaration**, setting out a road map toward the scheduled 2004 intergovernmental conference, which was unanimously agreed upon by the fifteen heads of state and government present. Its central paragraph reads: "The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent, and more efficient. It also has to resolve three basic challenges: how to bring citizens--and primarily the young--closer to the European design and the European institutions, how to organize politics and the European political area in an enlarged Union, and how to develop Union into a stabilizing factor in the new, multi-polar world." (Leonard 2002)

The second agenda was to rebuild the European cooperation round a **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**. To date this coordination of foreign policy and security concerns has been difficult to achieve, in spite of progress in appointing particular representatives for the policy and for external affairs (including Javier Solana appointed EU's first high representative for a common foreign and security policy), and advances in security cooperation. In part this was because a different organisation with different but largely overlapping membership seemed to cover some of these issues. From 1996-7 NATO succeeded in taking on a more European look and engaging European interests more closely, a move which allowed greater French and Spanish participation. This allowed France to begin to cooperate more closely with 'Europeanised' NATO down till 2001 (see for example Gordon 1997). A new core of Anglo-French cooperation down till 2002 was able to reinvigorate a **new European security arm** (the European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI – leading to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force) distinct from NATO, but it must be remembered that the defence budgets of most major European states are declining and in many ways these nations remain dependent on key U.S. based intelligence and mobility assets (Taylor 2000; Gordon 1997). This **idea continues to gain momentum, with European nations**, for example, being more heavily involved in peace-keeping in Kosovo and Macedonia through 2002-2004, but the issue of the degree of coordination with NATO still remains to be fully developed (these and other issues will receive further treatment in week 10).

The third movement has been the evolution towards **extending the monetary union, (EMU)**, the creation of a unified currency, a shared central bank and a common fiscal policy. The main engine for a 'single Europe' would remain the idea of Europe as a single European market. Europe for a time became the biggest single market in the world, and with expansion through 2004 will have some 450 million citizens. Its aim was to eventually allow the free movement of goods, persons, services and communications throughout Europe without internal barriers. This last aim is the one which has in fact been most effectively achieved, but the timetable remains controversial, and Britain, for example, has remained outside the *euro* zone. The future of the pound, and its implications for British sovereignty and monetary policy remain highly controversial, as do proposed reforms for the European Central Bank as the EU expands, with plans for a UK referendum on the issue before 2006, but probably not until well into 2004, depending on whether the government want to run this issue alongside elections (*European Report* 2003).

Likewise, **free movement of peoples**, especially in the area of migration, has been a contentious issue, since the opening up of internal barriers has meant that the external borders of Europe need to be well managed to control issues such as illegal migration, various forms of smuggling, money laundering and organised crime. On this basis, countries such as Spain, France and Italy have been concerned about **uncontrolled migration** from North Africa, while Germany and Austria have been sensitive about prospective migration flows from Eastern Europe and Russia. To date, Europe has sought to improve control of its external borders, while freeing movement within Europe. This will place special burdens on new member countries as they become new frontiers of an expanding EU, with special pressures along frontiers into the Ukraine and across to Turkey.

These trends towards the wider Europe, however, are also affected by the **broader international setting**. Indeed, the success of 'One Europe' remains very much based on the ability of the Europe Union to function in its immediate setting of wider Europe (including all of Eastern Europe and Russia), its **interaction with nearby regions** (north Africa and the Middle East), and how it relates to emerging global trends. Europe has to remain competitive in economic terms compared to North America and East Asia, but also retain a strongly cooperative agenda which allows it to share in global governance. Likewise, the EU has developed a special **Euro-Mediterranean dialogue** designed boost regional cooperation, aid development in poor economies, and reduce push factors in relation to illegal workers. This processes have picked up over the last two years, but is unlikely to meet the aspirations of countries such as Morocco and Algeria in the short term.

3. Revolutions in East Europe and the former Soviet Union

The **collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire** obviously effected European integration for it led to immediate and dramatic changes on the map of Europe (see Zeman 1991). The two parts of **Germany could then be reunited**, but the concerns of France, Britain and the US over this empowered Germany could only be moderated if this new and powerful Germany was embedded in a integrated European system. Meanwhile, by 1992 the former Soviet bloc broke apart as an alliance system controlling Eastern Europe (1988-1992) and the Soviet Union itself splintered into independent states (1991-1992), each anxious to convert their centralised economies into free market models, open to both trade and investment from the West. This transformation, however, has been both complex and uneven, with even relatively successful states such as Poland and the Czech Republic still concerned about the economic impact of their openness to the West (Radzim 2000; Jackson et al. 2003).

Germany has emerged as Europe's most powerful national economy with over 80 million inhabitants and a GDP larger than any of its European neighbours. It has played a major role in trade and investment with Eastern Europe and Russia. This raises the question of Germany's future as a member of the EU and its objectives in seeking unification. Some feared that a strong independent Germany might threaten political and economic domination of the European continent for the third time. The Germans were among the first to recognise the dangers. **They have insisted reunification take place within a deepening European framework**. To that end former Chancellor Kohl and France's then President Mitterand agreed that negotiations on political union would take place parallel to the discussions concerning the EU. The result was a deepened push towards the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, December 1991), which set the path towards monetary union and outlined other forms of cooperation. This was certainly by no means the last word on European Union, but a new stage in the process along the way. Likewise, the German model of federalism with strong local state powers has sometimes been pushed as a possible model for any European Constitution, with issue coming to the forefront over the 2001-2004 period.

The nations of **Eastern Europe** originally were not unlike those of the West, sharing much of the formative experience of Europe during the 17th to 19th centuries. After 1945 they shared different heritage through Communist rule. Their politics was

dominated by authoritarian parties, their economies relied on public ownership and state planning, their social and cultural lives were heavily politicised, and their external relations dominated by the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Affairs (the CMEA) which sought to integrate military and economic policy. This was largely done under Soviet direction and with a clear understanding of Soviet military dominance, though communist countries such as Yugoslavia and Albania tried to gain some degree of independence from Moscow, Yugoslavia by flirting with the non-aligned movement (NAM), Albania by temporary alignment with China.



Central Europe (Map courtesy PCL Map Library)

The states of Eastern Europe mainly shared the central features of the **Soviet model** (this model and its dramatic decline will be covered in a little more detail in week 3). Most of these countries followed the Marxist-Leninist line developed in the Soviet Union, resting on the complete control of politics and society by ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (i.e. strong centralised government), single party rule, a planned economy, and strictly limited public information. The government dominated the mass media, the education system, the arts, and limited public discourse. These states

were authoritarian (verging on totalitarian in various periods), and lacked the full development of an independent civil society outside of governmental control. As we shall see, this has meant that transition to fully democratic societies has been dramatic but painful through the early 1990s, with rapid progress to meet EU accession requirements generating rapid reform over the last 5 years.

A second defining feature of the East European states was **public ownership and the management of economic life**. There were some important exceptions: in Poland and Yugoslavia for example, most land was privately owned and managed, and in Poland peasant still farmed sections of the land. All heavy industry, steel production, finance and foreign trade, however, was state owned and managed, usually in cycles of five year plans. The state accounted for over 90% of national income in most of these states. The five year plans were usually designed to meet major communist goals, e.g. modern steel production levels to compete with the West, electrification, modernisation of defence industries, etc., and were to be rigidly followed. It was this centrally controlled economy which came under enormous strain through the early 1980s and began to collapse by the late 1980s, especially in Russia and Poland. This was one of the main impulses toward political reform, in Russia led from 'above' by leaders such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin), while in Poland massive social organisation via the trade union Solidarity helped generate an effective opposition to the communist state. **In large part this was triggered by a new generation of Russian leaders: Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin** are part of a new 'technocratic generation' with viewpoints departing from the older patterns.

In Eastern Europe moreover there was **strong government control of the media**. Some subjects such as price increases and epidemics could not be mentioned in the press at all. Indeed when the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl took place in April 1986 it had a veil of secrecy surrounding it so tight that the eventual cost in human lives proved to be much higher than originally known. Likewise, environmental and associated health problems were not clearly reported or even recorded in government documents in either Russia or Poland during the 1980s. It must be remembered that some 15 reactors of a similar type to Chernobyl were still in operation in eastern Europe and Russia as of 1996 (*St. Petersburg Press* 1996). The then Group of Seven (G-7) held a summit on nuclear security and safety in Moscow on 20 April 1996, and provided aid and advice on Russian reactors and security measures against the 'diversions' of weapons grade nuclear material. It also specified 5 plants most urgently in need to improved safeguards, i.e. Tomsk-7, at Chelyabinsk-65, Krasnoyarsk-26, Sverdlovsk-44, the Elektrostal Machine Building Plant near Moscow, and a Novosibirsk Plant (*Strategic Comments* 1996). Today, the press are much more free than before in Eastern Europe, but there is concern that **indirect control of the Russian media** has been re-established through vested interests, oligarchic millionaires, and agencies connected with the government (*PR Newswire* 2000). This was also part of the wider concern about lack of effective opposition candidates that could run fairly against President Putin in March 2004, a fact leading to concern by both the OSCE and the Council of Europe (UPI 2004).

The **collapse of communist rule** was undoubtedly not only a surprise to many in the West it was a surprise to those within the communist system. Growth rates throughout eastern Europe and Russia peaked in the 1970s, and began to seriously decline thereafter (Desai 1989, pp3-4, p27). Gorbachev himself stated that it was economic,

not political factors, which set him on his path of reform after 1987 (Gorbachev 1987, p19). The **collapse of economic performance** by the eighties also sharpened the social divisions as working conditions deteriorated and prices rose and shortages increased. This made the privileges of the elite party members, the *nomenklatura*, who had special school, special medical care, special shops with access to imported goods, and often weekend houses, less acceptable to ordinary citizens.

There were external factors as well. Under the Soviet leader Brezhnev any departure from socialist principles had been regarded as a direct threat to the socialist community as a whole, hence there was no hesitation in Warsaw Pact intervention to squash the government of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and to invade Afghanistan in 1979. Under Mikhail Gorbachev however it was made clear that such intervention was a thing of the past. Indeed, Gorbachev himself preferred moderate reform in Eastern Europe. Reforms in Poland through the 1980s, and a growing sense of freedom to change swept through Eastern Europe between 1989-1990. It is unlikely that Gorbachev expected his reforms to have such sweeping effects, but one of the lessons learnt from the period 1987-2004 is that **change can be rapid and relatively unpredictable** from the framework of traditional conceptions such as national foreign policy, 'balance of power', or political realism. The revolution in Eastern Europe also radically forced a revision on thinking about the European Community and about NATO. Both now existed in **a much wider and more open European space**. **'Wider Europe'** was and is a crucial challenge for both the EU and NATO.

4. The Wider Europe Economic and Political Environment

Several factors, some from past relationships, some emerging from the 1990s, meant that it was **not possible to consider Europe as a closed continental system**. These factors include:

- 1) The 20th century notion of an **Atlantic Culture, bringing together Europe and North America** as modern, advanced, industrial nations. This trend is underpinned by the NATO organisation, and by **the 'special relationship' which has existed between Britain and the United States**. Today, the U.S. seems keen to maintain its influence through NATO, but recognises that there are strong tensions within Europe concerning U.S. global leadership. This trend is only partly counterbalanced by those in Europe who would like to 'go it alone', including elements in France and Germany. This strength of this Atlantic Alliance was further developed with the intervention of NATO into Bosnia in late 1995, and NATO implementation or stabilisation forces active there through 1996-1997, and with moves in 1996-1997 aimed at re-fashioning NATO to give it a more European command structure with greater French participation. Further tensions over the role of NATO emerged after its intense air campaign over Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999, whose effectiveness has since been fiercely debated. Through 1997-2004 NATO has begun to establish its political credentials as a security organisation which does much more than simply defend its members territory – it has begun to built patterns of cooperation and operational abilities in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Likewise, through 2002-2003 a new NATO-plus-One meeting (the NATO-Russia Council) has been formed to allow improved dialogue between NATO and Russia. How far this 'out of area' role should be extended, however, remains problematic. Likewise, **whether**

NATO is the best 'glue' for linking U.S. and European interests remains to be seen.

2) The changes in Eastern Europe mean that the EU cannot rely on a militarily closed and insulated border for its security to the east. **Economic, migration and foreign policy issues** must now cater for the complex factors of East European politics. Likewise, **social policies within the Council of Europe** (a much wider diplomatic grouping than the EU and comprising of some 40 countries from Europe, East-Europe and the former Soviet region, not be confused with the European Council, see Bainbridge 1998) and the OSCE have been designed to further a 'deep' democracy and reduce social ills such as racism and xenophobia. For example, the Council of Europe has 'concluded negotiations on the Draft First Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist or xenophobic nature committed through computer systems', with implementation after June 2002 (*Council of Europe* 2002).

3) The **EU relationship with Russia** will remain vital. Under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin, Russian policy has insisted that the Russians have a major role to play in Europe as a European power. At the same time, most Russian leaders still wish this to be conceived of as a **special role, not just one nation among many**. Likewise, there have been moves by Russia to retain a strong role in 'former Soviet space', with special security and economic interests with Belarus and much of the Caucasus and Central Asia (the old CIS zone). This 'near abroad' policy may be part of a policy of counterbalancing U.S. and NATO influence in Europe. In spite of strong official support for deepening security cooperation between the U.S. and Russia through 2001-2004, the increased American engagement with Central Asian states has changed the balance of power in the region. Combined with economic and social problems within Russia, these problems make it clear that there is no guarantee that Russian and EU interests will always converge, though Putin seems to be leaning towards greater cooperation with Europe, especially France and Germany, as a way to gain some relative independence from U.S. strategic and foreign policy dominance.

4) To the south, Europe is faced by both **economic opportunities and political dangers in North Africa and the Middle East**. Any notion of a 'pacific' Mediterranean needs to build a constructive engagements if a 'fortress Europe' mentality is to be avoided. France in particular, and Spain to some degree, have stressed the importance of looking south and east in shaping security and diplomatic policy. Through the mid and late 1990s, France and Germany took a diplomatic initiatives in relation to Lebanon and Palestine (*Financial Times* 1996), and urged that the EU and Russia take a bigger role in the peace process again in 2002-2003, a call made at the new Franco-Russian Security Cooperation Council (*Xinhua* 2002). France, Germany and Russia have also been critical of the US side-lining of the UN Security Council in relation to the war with Iraq, and have sought greater UNSC involvement in the governance of Iraq during reconstruction (see Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003). Through 1995-2004, southern European nations, in conjunction with some North African and Middle Eastern states, have attempt to develop investment programmes that will reduce migration pressure on Europe as a whole. Following the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers Conference, held in Barcelona in November, 1995, annual efforts have been made to improve security and prosperity in the region, and to **begin the creation of a 'Mediterranean Cooperation and Partnership Zone'**.

5) To the south-east, new opportunities have opened with trade through the Bulgaria and Romania, while **Turkey** is now playing a major role in foreign relations with the new Central Asian states. The OSCE (organisation for Security and Cooperation for Europe) has recognised that a **stable Central Asia is essential for a stable Russia and Eastern Europe**, and has therefore admitted these new states as members. The OSCE also tried to mediate recent conflicts within the Russian Republic, most lately between Moscow and Chechnya. Turkey is a member of NATO, and has entered into a trade agreement (customs union) with the EU. However, full membership in the EU is complicated by Turkey's past poor human rights record, by cultural differences, and tensions concerning Cyprus. The Turkish leadership in 1998 has felt strongly rebuffed by the EU, and relations were then at a low point. The complicated diplomacy between Greece, Turkey, the two communities in Cyprus, the EU, Germany and the U.S. give us a hint of some of the complexities in expanding EU membership (*Turkish Daily News* 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1996d). Relations between the EU and Turkey improved in 1999 with recognition of its application, but Turkey even through 2003 was still slated as most likely to gain admittance last into the EU (for these complications, see Yesilada 2002). Through 2004, though Cyprus has entered the EU, no agreement to permanently resolve the division between the north and south parts of the island, leading to the curious case of a divided country entering the EU.

6) With interdependence in economics and communications creating a new global system, **Europe has a major role to play globally**. Taken as a whole the EU is a global power which can take up important economic, political, developmental, environmental, and now, via the ERRF, even military roles. However, in the past, **Europe has had a hard time in speaking with a single voice, and has not always acted quickly to avert nearby disasters**, e.g. delays in intervening in the Bosnian crisis through the mid-1990s. The question is whether shared economic, social, security and foreign policies can allow a stronger projection of European interests onto the world stage. The EU has tried to position this role in terms of **new patterns of governance that embrace environmental, social, civil society and democratization issues**. Whether this brand of diplomacy will become strong globally remains to be seen, especially when such policies seem to be used in favor of narrower EU interests, e.g. agricultural trade policies which impose strong conditions (and costs) on developing countries.

These trends show that **successful management of the current European integration agenda remains crucial for the near future**. How this will be achieved, and whether these new relations will be stable and productive, remains to be seen. Here, not just who is admitted is important, but the order of enlargement and how well these countries integrate into Europe whether mutual gains are generated is crucial. In particular, a retreat by European organisations or social policies to a closed 'continental Europe' would have a negative impact on world security and on world trade. **Through 2003-2004, the EU has opted for relatively fast expansion combined with engagement with wider zones adjacent to its expanding border.**

5. The Dynamics of the New Europe

These background factors indicate the complexity of the dynamics of the new Europe (Jacquemin & Wright 1993). Some see a **deepening of integration** within Europe before its can proceed to meet its deeper economic and political goals. The early

ineffectiveness of EU intervention in the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis (as distinct from NATO intervention) underlines the way Europe has only slowly developed political cohesion at the level of foreign policy. Europe from 1999 returned to a **major role in peace-keeping and economic stabilisation of the Balkans region**, indicating a renewed emphasis to deal with challenges in its immediate environment. Likewise, through 1999-2004 has taken on a major Balkans stabilization role and increasing its efforts at building institutions, combined with ongoing deployments of peacekeeper and building Stabilization and Associational agreement with these states (see Pnadolfi 2003). With **strong concerns over the social impact of further integration and widening being voiced in France, Denmark and Britain (and Norway)**, there is also some concern that the trends towards European integration will run on several different clocks, with different countries gaining differential benefits from the process.

In the past, there were fears of a kind of French-German hegemony in Europe, rather than a genuine equality among nations within a supranational Europe. At the very least, concerns remain about the **relative power of large states** such as Germany, Britain and France compared to their small neighbours. Moïsi and Mertes have stated how difficult charting this path can be: -

West European governments seem mired in technocratic, soulless discussion of ways to build on the three pillars of the EU - institutional reform, economic and monetary union, and common foreign and security policies. Fixated on how to "do" Europe, they have lost sight of the moral values and fundamental cultural and political objectives that constitute the "why" of it. (Moïsi & Mertes 1995, p123)

To these **three pillars**: the European Community (based on the Treaty of Rome), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Bainbridge 1998), there is now a sustained effort to extend to a **fourth pillar** of a strong and inclusive **European Defence Initiative** which might back up its foreign policy (see Gonzalez 1999). Likewise, the legal qualification of European citizenship has not yet deeply translated into a strong and coherent **European identity** which easily replaces older forms of patriotism or nationalism (see Hedetaft 1998). This issue will become even more important as Europe expands eastwards through 2004 to include new member states with very different experiences over the last 60 years to those of Western Europe.

A number of **other pressing concerns** confront Europe, as outlined by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi: -

There are two key questions confronting us : what does Europe need now, and what does the European Union need in order to serve Europe?

First, Europe needs vigorous and sustained growth to defeat unemployment and social exclusion, and to give the EU greater weight in our own region of the world and globally.

Second, Europe needs security. External security must be achieved by reducing unrest and tension on our borders. Internal security must be achieved by combating crime, including organised crime. Crime needs to be tackled at its source which often lies in institutional disorder, poor education, social injustice and the soullessness of inner cities and suburbs. Security should also mean a safe environment and safe consumer products, in particular safe food.

Third, Europe needs a sense of meaning and purpose. We Europeans are the heirs of a civilisation deeply rooted in religious and civic values. Our civilisation today is being enriched by its openness to other cultures. What we need now is a humanistic perspective. Daily and systematically, our economic and social system must recognize the primacy of human dignity. It must ensure that all our citizens have genuine access to liberty, inter-personal communication, culture and spiritual life.

Fourth, Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests : we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority. (Prodi 2000)

The 'how' and 'why' of the new Europe in its international setting form two of the main themes of this course. To deal with these fundamental issues, we will look at Europe along a number of tangents. These tangents are the basis of the lecture and seminar series. By Week 12 we will arrive at an analysis in detail of the future prospects for EU, the European Region, and for Europe's global role. As we shall see, there are many more prospects for Europe than just integration or disintegration (see Kaletsky 1997; Rosamond 2000, pp130-156). **Europe has opted for a democratic and market system with considerable decision-making and sovereignty passed up to regional institutions (supranationalism).** Whether this new Europe can help stabilise adjacent regions in the long term, and provide new models for civil and political cooperation, remains to be seen (see Kelly 2003). **To undertake these tasks Europe will need to take on wider dimensions of global, military and international power.**

6. Bibliography and Further Resources

Resources

The official Webpage of the *European Commission* will be found at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/index.htm>

A range of information on European international relations will be found at the *Eurforic, Europe's Forum on International Cooperation* at <http://www.euforic.org/>

Useful updates on European Affairs will be found at the *Council of Europe Portal* at <http://www.coe.int/portalT.asp>

Further Reading

To further your knowledge, you might like to look at one of the following: -

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