

Regional Organisations and Regionalism: Hemispheric Diplomatic and Trade Systems

R. James Ferguson

Bond University, QLD

Topics: -

- 1. Early Visions: Unity, Conflict and Emerging Cooperation*
- 2. The Organisation of American States*
- 3. Summit of the Americas and Other Activity Groups*
- 4. The Future of the Hemispheric Dream*
- 5. Bibliography and Resources*

1. Early Visions: Unity, Conflict and Emerging Cooperation

As we have already seen, the early 18th century history of Latin America was dominated by the need to **find independence from Spain (and other European powers)**, followed by the rapid establishment of a large number of different **nation-states** (see lectures 1-2). Spain had to face declarations of independence from South American states as early as 1811, and was gradually forced to accept independence for most of its colonies from 1836 down till 1882, with Brazil establishing its independence from Portugal by 1822 and becoming a Republic through 1889-1891 (August 1999, p45).

Behind this pattern, however, another issue emerged. **To what degree should these diverse emerging states cooperate?** The original liberators of South America, especially **Simón Bolívar**, had **hoped for formal cooperation among the new states**. The hope was that this would **moderate border tensions, create a cooperative system of American states, and make the region too strong for European re-conquest**. However, this dream was not achieved, leaving open the issue of governance both within and among the states of the region -

Yet stability, save for a few relative exceptions, was to remain a mirage in Spanish America. Unity also proved impossible to achieve. Bolívar's great dream of a pan-American union came to nothing. A congress he called in Panama in 1826 to discuss an alliance of the Spanish American nations met with little response. The idea of an Andean confederation comprising Gran Colombia, Peru and Bolivia never got off the ground. Even his own state of Gran Colombia started to disintegrate, with Venezuela and Ecuador cutting loose from the authority of Bogotá. On 17 December 1830 Bolívar died of tuberculosis while on his way to self-imposed exile in Europe. He had become a disillusioned man; shortly before he died he made his most famous observation on the colonies he had helped to emancipate: 'America is ungovernable. Those who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea.' (Williamson 1992, pp231-232; for the limited success of other Spanish American Conferences in 1847, 1865, 1877 and 1888, see Atkins 1999, pp176-177)

The second major issue which complicated this cooperation was the question of **how the borders among these states be established, delineated and accepted**, bearing in mind that most of these countries had been colonies expanding out into the hinterland or along the coast from original settlement areas. In this context, early Latin American nations suffered from **border conflicts** and from a **certain degree of fragmentation** as new states were formed (see weeks 1-2). Thus Brazil and Argentina would suffer from conflicts over their mutual zone of interaction, with expensive conflicts over control of the Río de la Plata, leading eventually to the creation of the independent state of Uruguay in 1828, acting as a partial buffer. Thus, the **'South Cone balance-of-power system began with intense rivalry among Argentina, Brazil and Chile (the "ABC" states)**, with Peru drawn in indirectly, and "buffer" status for Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia' (Atkins 1999, p45), tensions which have been reduced but not entirely eliminated through the late 20th century (see lectures 6 and 7).

Disputed territorial claims would be largely dealt with through a century of conflict and diplomacy, with **most disputes being resolved or shelved through the 1990s**. Colombia would eventually lose the region of Panama, which became an independent state in 1903, but only on the basis of U.S. protection in order to guarantee the construction of the Panama Canal. Chile would

extend its control northward to gain access to valuable nitrate resources through wars against Peru and Bolivia. As a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and the Treaty of Ancón in 1884, Chile acquired two northern provinces - Tarapacá from Peru and Antofagasta from Bolivia (Hudson 1994), though Bolivia has again raised the issue of access to sea ports on the Pacific through 2004. Tensions also existed between Chile and Argentina over the control of islands in the Straits of Magellan, really part of a **longer debate about relative naval power and power relations in the Southern Cone** (Falcoff 2000), while Argentina continued to dispute British control of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands during the twentieth century, once militarily, but more generally through diplomacy. Although **most borders had begun to stabilise by the 20th century, a number of disputed or militarised borders could still cause conflict**, e.g. Ecuador and Peru had a sharp conflict over disputed border territories during 1995-1996. This led to militarisation and mining of parts of the Ecuador and Peru border, with these tensions being partially eased through 2003 with partial opening of the border. Likewise, potential spill-overs for internal conflict in Colombia have been of considerable concern to Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador through 2003-2006.

The third issue that has emerged has been the strong cultural, **political and economic differences that have emerged between North America and Latin America** (Véliz 1994). On this basis, there have been at times **sharp differences of political viewpoint between North and South**, exaggerated by the economic and power preponderance of the United States (asymmetrical power relations), as well as by direct conflicts with countries such as Cuba, and various forms of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), Panama, Grenada and Haiti. **At times there were periods of relative convergence**, e.g. the U.S. fostered Alliance for Progress which from 1959 down through the mid-1960s when for a time American policy makers added the notion of national development within Latin American countries to the idea of hemispheric security (Atkins 1999, p48).

From the 1990s there has been a **growing convergence of broad economic interests** in many of these countries, e.g. among the United States, Mexico, Argentina, and to a lesser extent Brazil, partly furthered by economic cooperation through NAFTA and by some general convergence on the need to open these economies to increased trade, investment and financial flows (though these also entail certain risks as well). Likewise, the bumpy negotiations from 2003-2006 for the **Central America Free Trade Agreement CAFTA**, focusing initially on Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica and offering better **access to U.S. investment and trade**, has been complicated by different view of the U.S. and its poorer neighbours: the U.S. hoped for faster finalisation, while **Central American countries have a range of internal and regional issues to resolve**, e.g. different visions of privatisation issues for telecommunications, e.g. requiring law reform in Guatemala (*Latin American Institute* 2003; *NotiCen* 2006). Likewise, concerns have been raised about the viability of small-scale Central American farmers as they compete with North American produce including staples such as corn and rice, with fear for job losses in agriculture, e.g. the NGO Mesa Global claims a possible decrease in Guatemalan 'agriculture of between 9.62% and 29.28% during a 10-year period beginning with the onset of CAFTA' (Ricker 2004; *NotiCen* 2004b). Although El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala had in principle ratified most of its terms through late 2004, **El Salvador has been the first to actually implement CAFTA through early 2006**, but has had to deal with widespread international resistance by left wing parties and campesino organisation to some of its conditions, e.g. acceptance of the primacy of U.S. based meat inspection systems over those of Central American claims, claims of the undermining of national sovereignty, privatisation of the water supply, a crack-down on pirated audio and video materials, with up to 60,000 families engaged in this business (*NotiCen* 2006). In turn, the **Bush administration has supported the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadoran workers** in the US (over 200,000 under the TPS), whose repatriation of funds is the largest source of foreign exchange for the country, and is likely in fact to add more to the national economy than the specific gains of the CAFTA process in the short term (*NotiCen* 2006).

Supporters have in turn argued that CAFTA is the only way to push forward economic reform and long-term sustainable growth, with most governments seeking some optimisation of the agreement before its full implementation.

At the same time, **alternative visions of economic cooperation** go against NAFTA-style rule based integration, e.g. Brazil's vision of Mercosur and inter-regional cooperation with the EU, Venezuela's effort to build and alternative energy network for South America and the Caribbean and offer special deals investment (this has included buying Argentinian government bonds, an offer to do the same for Ecuador, and even the idea of buying a nuclear power plant from Argentina, *Economist* 2005a; Australian 2005d), or idea of a 'third way' aimed at creating a more humane form of neo-liberal economic development, called the **Buenos Aires Consensus**, though this was not fully adopted (Sader 2003). This last aimed at creating a 'strong, active and healthy state', eradication of poverty and corruption, selective and effective privatisation which is not merely used to pay off foreign debt, and avoiding the creation of private 'semi-monopolies' (Andres 1998; discussed further in week 12).

However, aside from the loose cultural grouping that can be identified as 'Latin America' (see lecture 1), there has even been **doubt about how far Latin America and the Caribbean can be viewed as an integrated unit: -**

Many specialists on Latin America are skeptical of region-wide conceptualizations, saying that the great differences and heterogeneity among the states within the region and their tremendous diversity in numerous aspects are so profound that generalizations are virtually impossible. Some even argue that Latin America no longer exists as a region susceptible to precise analysis. Many of them prefer to concentrate on the individual countries and subregions within Latin America. Others emphasize a larger regional level, an inter-American system of informal interaction and formal organization among all of the state in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, they see regularized inter-American cooperation as required for the resolution of the salient international issues and problems. (Atkins 1999, p27)

As we have already seen, there are **some shared cultural and political realities in the region, as well as a shared historical experience and common developmental problems**. The different parts of Latin America have interacted intensely with each other. From the 1980s there has also been **growing convergence and collaboration in the foreign policy** of many Latin American states, called *concertación* (Atkins 1999, p98). Today, much of this activity is being channelled through around a number of **regional organisations and summit processes**. Latin America has been very active in attempting to form regional organisations, including the **Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which formed in 1961 but in 1980 was re-organised as the Latin American Integration Association** (Atkins 1999, p33; for this period, see further pp178-180). The **Andean Group was formed in 1966** in part on fears of foreign penetration due to multinational activities in opening markets, **seeking to access some form of compensation and protection for weaker, developing states** (Atkins 1999, p180, p189). It hoped at first to set up a common market based on planned industrialisation and a shared development strategy.

Various groupings within Latin America have occurred, partly because of **shared efforts at development: -**

This development is reflected in the intra-Southern Cone state integration organisation, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), which began forming in 1990. In 1998 MERCOSUR consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile as associate members; other South American countries will probably join. The Platine countries of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia have mutual self-identification, reflected, among other ways, in their organization of the Cuenca del Plata accord in 1969 for regional infrastructure development. The Amazonic countries - Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia - have considered themselves as an international unit, in as much as in 1978 they signed the Amazon Pact for the controlled development of the Amazon Basin. The Andean countries - Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile - formed the Andean Group within the Latin American Free Trade Association in 1966 to foster their own integration; it has continued to the present. (Atkins 1999, p38).

Indeed, **democracy and summitry** seemed to sweep across Latin America together: -

When democracy swept across Latin America in the 1980s, it brought with it the summit. In fact, a plethora of them: the fortunate Latin American leader sees his peers annually at the Rio Group and the Ibero-American summit (which includes Spain, Portugal and otherwise-shunned Cuba), not to mention at sub-regional gatherings (Mercosur's presidents meet twice a year). Then there are triennial get-togethers with the United States and Canada, and with the EU (*Economist* 2001).

Today, however, we will focus on a two organisations that are currently very active, especially the OAS and the Summit of the Americas, with Mercosur being looked at in later weeks. These groupings provide **key inter-american linkages** (north and south), as well as cooperation within differing zones of Latin America.

The inter-american (hemispheric) system in general terms is based on several overlapping agendas and institutions, including:

- **The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance** (the Rio Treaty of 1947, also known as the Rio Pact). Its main principle defined 'an attack on any American state, from inside or outside the hemisphere, as an attack on all, requiring collective measures to counter the aggression' (Skidmore & Smith 2001, p369).
- **The Organization of American States, OAS**, founded in 1948 (see below)
- **The Inter-American Development Bank**, established in 1959 (Cooper & Legler 2001),
- **The Summit of the Americas** process set up from 1994 (see below).
- **Mercosur, the Common Market of the South, a Southern Cone grouping that has been highly active since 1991**, and has since entered into regional dialogue with Andean nations, with the EU, and with North America over the proposed FTAA (Mercosur will be looked at in later lectures).

Other important players include the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Pan American Health Organisation, the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), and a range of aid organisations and NGOs (see Rosenberg 2001). In the past, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was of considerable interest to many Latin American states (16 joined, including Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, and Panama), but its importance for the region has declined through the 1990s (Atkins 1999, p105). Countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Colombia, in different ways, have become aligned largely with U.S. regional policies during the last decade, while Chile has sought to trade into the U.S., the Mercosur region, and East Asia (see lecture 7). At the same time, **a partial tilt to the left** in Latin America in recent years (including Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia) has meant that U.S. policies have to engage these states on their own terms and interests, allowing for a more dynamic role in some organisations (see below).

The action of these organisations is **partially convergent with global level organisations** including the UNSC, UNDP, UNEP and UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). The collective action of these agencies is **multilateral** (see Boehm & Hernández-Roy 1999), in that it involves many countries, many different organisations and summits, and **to some degree tries to engage civil society and informal or second-track diplomacy** (see below). Thus we can speak of a '**new regionalism**' which has to take into account the activities of global-level organisations (the UN, WTO, World Bank etc.) and globalisation led by strong economic interactions (finance, investment, trade, and transnational corporations), but is also sensitive to the action of International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs) and international civil society organisations and agenda. This regionalism tries to be **outward-looking and open**, rather than inward and exclusive in orientation (Carranza 2000). In the case of security and human rights, for example, the OAS often has to coordinate with the mandates or expectations

of the UNSC and UN missions, while in turn the OAS is able to provide key resources for regional problems (see Nguyen 2002; see further below).

However, this integrative trend remains politically **highly contested and very controversial**. Most recently, developmental issues and the debate over whether neo-liberal economic policies aid the poor has been raised again from early 2002. At the **United Nations-sponsored International Conference on Financing for Development** in Monterrey, Mexico, President Bush has promised a 50% increase in U.S. aid globally (a total of approximately \$10 billion over a three year plan), so long as this can be tied to successful outcomes rather than 'old failures', and so long as recipient governments put their own economic houses in order and attack corruption (Hurst 2002). These neo-liberal views were strongly criticised by President Castro in a pre-meeting public speech. Indeed, the March 2002 tour by President Bush to several Latin American countries was aimed in part at domestic minorities within the U.S., rather than launching genuinely new policies. At the same, **the role of regional organisations in aiding regional stability and growth remains highly contested**, with strong criticism directed, for example, at the limits of the OAS (see below). Indeed, different models of the role of government and the speed and degree of opening to the global economy are behind the debates over Mercosur and the FTAA, as well as complicating U.S. relations with countries such as Brazil. Likewise, through 2003-2005 the simple concept that open trade will eventually eradicate poverty has been rejected in recent Summit of the Americas meetings (see below).

Nonetheless, many of these groups have begun to **share some values and long-term goals**. In particular, a **number of organisations have begun to converge on democracy and good governance** as key issues for the future of the region: -

The connection between democratic values and regional governance institutions has become increasingly accepted. In the West Hemisphere, this pattern is associated most closely with the revitalization of the Organization of American States (OAS), in tandem with the emergence of what has been termed an interamerican "paradigm of

democratic solidarity". In declaratory terms, a growing consensus for OAS members to pursue collective action to promote and defend democracy in the region has been enshrined in a cluster of interamerican legal documents, including the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias (1985), the Santiago Commitment and Resolution 1080 (1991), the Washington Protocol (1992), the Managua Declaration (1993), and the Declarations and Plans of Action of the Miami and Santiago Summits of the Americas (1994, 1998). (Cooper & Legler 2001; see further Atkins 1999)

Although an **aspiration**, this orientation has not yet been fully achieved. Interventions and protests have occurred over events in Haiti (1991; with ongoing problems through 2002-2006) and Guatemala (1993), as well as the creation of the **OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy** (Cooper & Legler 2001). OAS reaction to events in Paraguay (1996, 1999-2000) and Ecuador (in January 2000 over regime transference to the Vice President Gustavo Noboa), and to moderate events in Venezuela through 2002-2004 were more limited (Cooper & Legler 2001). Moreover, taken as a whole, **Latin America is not unified on the issue of how far military force might be used in intervention situations**: Brazil and Mexico in particular, and the Rio Group (including most of Latin America and the Caribbean, see below) in general are reluctant to use military force to intervene directly to protect democracy (Cooper & Legler 2001), and the **concepts of non-intervention (or invited or permissive interventions)** remain strong in the OAS. Further, as we shall see, **rhetoric and reality have not always matched** (see below), with human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch suggesting that the record of these institutions in supporting democracy was at first 'so poor as to endanger credibility' (*Economist* 2001).

2. The Organisation of American States

The OAS was founded in 1948. It has a **Permanent Council, a General Assembly, and a Secretariat** which provides ongoing coordination, as well as an Inter-American Council for Integral Development. By 1991 the **OAS included all 35 sovereign states of the region**, with 40 states from outside the region being observers (Atkins 1999, p39). **Cuba became a 'non-participating**

member' since 1962. In 1961 the United States had brought charges against Cuba in the OAS, arguing that it was destroying the inter-American system by aligning with the Soviets, with Cuba thereafter being effectively excluded from the organisation (Quirk 1993, p397, p400), The OAS has **sought to be the main coordinating organisation for the region, with democracy being viewed in its Charter as a precondition to peace, stability and development** (Boniface 2002, p365). Although this mission statement could not be sustained through the Cold War tensions, it has begun to seriously re-address this issue over the last two decades. However, this has been a gradual process until 2000. Thus, although Cuba was suspended from active membership in 1962, 'anticommunist' and authoritarian regimes were largely ignored in the 1960s and 1970s, and even in 1989 the OAS did not effectively intervene in the abuses of General Noriega in Panama, when the democratic elections were annulled (Boniface 2002, p365, p376). The issue of intervention has gained ground over the last several years, but remains fiercely disputed within the organisation (see below).

Table 1: OAS Member States (OAS 2005b)

	Grenada
	Guatemala
Antigua and Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
The Bahamas	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	Saint Kitts and Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Cuba (*)	Saint Vicent and the Grenadinas
Dominica	Suriname
Dominican Republic	Trinidad and Tobago
Ecuador	United States of America
El Salvador	Uruguay

Venezuela

(By resolution of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962) the current Government of Cuba is excluded from participation in the OAS*

The OAS has set up **special Inter-American Committees and Commissions** including (OAS 2003): -

- *The Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism-CICTE*
- *The Inter-American Juridical Committee*
- *The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights*
- *The Inter-American Court of Human Rights*
- *The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission*
- *The Inter-American Telecommunication Commission*
- *The Inter-American Committee on Ports*

Other agencies and specialised organisations coordinated through the OAS (OAS 2003) include: -

- *Unit for Social Development and Education*
- *Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment*
- *Unit for the Promotion of Democracy*
- *Inter-American Emergency Aid Fund*
- *Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development*
- *Pan American Health Organization*
- *Inter-American Children's Institute*
- *Inter-American Commission of Women*
- *Pan American Institute of Geography and History*
- *Inter-American Indigenous Institute*
- *Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture*

Since 1979 the OAS has moved to a stronger role in promoting democracy, beginning with the condemnation of human right abuses in Nicaragua under

the Somoza regime (Cooper & Legler 2001). **It moved into support for the Central American peace process through 1980s and 1990s**, with countries such as Canada playing a major role in peacekeeping (Atkins 1999, p53). However, in spite of amendments to the OAS Charter following the **Protocol of Cartagena de India**, (1985), there were still restrictions: thus the effort to 'promote democracy and consolidate representative democracy' was still 'with due respect to the **principle of non-intervention**' (OAS Charter, Article 2, Chapter 1, in Cooper & Legler 2001). Certain countries with the OAS have been extremely cautious of the prospect of force or any kind of military intervention on these issues. **Brazil and Mexico tend to be reluctant to go down this road of 'democratic intervention'**, and **Venezuela has argued for reform in the definition of democracy**, arguing that participatory democracy was as important as representative democracy (Cooper 2004, p102). Brazil, for example, had abstained on proposals to the UN Security Council to allow force to be used against Haiti in regard to the initial overthrow of the Aristide government in 1991 (Boniface 2002, p371, see further below). Furthermore, at first the OAS actions were limited to **denouncing anti-democratic actions, then to the threat of suspension from the organisation**, based on a two-thirds majority vote in the organisation (Cooper & Legler 2001; Cooper 2004, p93).

However, with the creation of the **Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD)** the OAS moved to a **much wider range of activities**, including monitoring peace processes, reintegrating combatants, monitoring elections, training democratic leaders, and the promotion of local government (Cooper & Legler 2001). Through late 2001 this moved to a formal **Inter-American Democratic Charter, defining a right to democracy for the peoples of the Americas**, and extending the types of emergencies that might need to be considered for intervention (Conaway 2001b; Boniface 2002, p366). Although accepted in principle, some Caribbean states needed more time to study the implications for international law, while Venezuela in particular wanted a stronger role for direct, participatory democracy, rather than just focusing on representative democracy (Conaway 2001b), thereby accommodating some the populist and presidentialist trends of President Chavez (see lecture 2; Corrales 2001).

With the adoption of **OAS Resolution 1080** (via 'Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System' in 1991), however, this **democratic norm** was effectively **entrenched in the organisation as a standard**, even if there were realist limits in its application (see Boniface 20002). The OAS secretary-general is required to call a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council to discuss any 'sudden or irregular' interruption of democratic processes within OAS member states (Boniface 2002, p365). At first this mean violent overthrow of governments and military coups, but now at least in theory **includes 'unconstitutional alteration' to the regime** (Boniface 2002, p366), though there may still be 'grey' areas where the organisation may be concerned but have no clear pretext to intervene (Cooper 2004, p98).

Likewise, the creation of the **Unit for Sustainable Development and the Environment** has taken the organisation into the heart of the developmental and environmental agenda that have become mainstream through the 1990s. The OAS has also begun discussion on a **proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, involving dialogue between OAS member states and 90 indigenous representatives** in April 2001. Although, some fourteen regional states have altered 'their constitutions to reflect the multicultural nature of their societies and to recognize some indigenous rights', issues such as indigenous rights to self-determination remain highly controversial (Conaway 2001a), and have not gained strong ground in Mexico or Chile. However, gradual progress has been made from February 2003 meeting on the draft Declaration. However, the Declaration does not have the 'weight of law', though it has been argued that the declaration might be taken into account in some legal cases (see Conaway 2003). This can be seen in the following case where there was a **linkage between indigenous and human rights**: -

Notwithstanding the uncertain prospects of both the OAS and the UN draft declarations, OAS jurisprudence on indigenous peoples' rights to their lands is moving forward with remarkable vigor. The impetus springs from both the complaints that indigenous plaintiffs diligently bring to the Inter-American Commission of Human

Rights (the Commission) alleging violations of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and to the principled behavior of the Commission itself in submitting meritorious cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court). On 31 August 2001, the Court issued a path-breaking decision regarding one such complaint that was pleaded before it by the Commission: Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua. The complaint was first filed in the Commission on behalf of the plaintiff by the U.S.-based Indian Law Resource Center. The Commission, finding the complaint compelling, in turn argued its merits to the Court. The latter, applying article 21 of the ACHR (guaranteeing the right of property), which it read in conjunction with the Constitution of Nicaragua (recognizing the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their communal forms of land ownership, use and enjoyment), as well as Nicaraguan domestic legislation

With that important foundation laid, the Court went on to confirm that the community of Awas Tingni held rights to their lands and resources in common, and in accord with the land-tenure system of their own culture, which governed in their territory. The state of Nicaragua violated these rights by, among other things, failing to demarcate the community's territory and issuing title thereon as required by its own legislation, and by unilaterally granting a logging concession in the territory to an outside timber company. Central to the decision was the Court's recognition that the communal ownership of lands by an indigenous people is a human right protected by the ACHR; that customary land-tenure laws control in indigenous territory; and that the integrity of indigenous territory may not be breached by the state or its concessionaire at the state's sole discretion. (Lam 2004)

In these areas, Canada has been a keen participant: -

Canada's diplomatic approach toward the Americas, for example, showcases the importance of entrepreneurial flair and technical competence. Despite its short experience in the OAS, dating back to only 1990, Canadian activism has gained widespread respect in the region. Canada helped revitalize the OAS after its relative decline during the 1980s. Its autonomous stance towards Cuba has mitigated any concern that Canada would be a passive follower of the United States. Canada's role in fostering favourable conditions for the development of representative democracy in the region has focused on the creation and funding of the UPD <Unit for the Promotion of Democracy>, participation in peacekeeping in Central America and Haiti, demining activities, and advocacy of a hemispheric multilateral approach to the problem of the drug trade. (Cooper & Legler 2001)

Likewise, Chile in recent years has also been a relatively active member of the OAS, supporting its democracy promotion agenda, and acting as an interlocutress with the Mercosur and Andean Group of nations (Cooper & Legler 2001). Most recently, they have led major peacekeeping forces in Haiti (along with Brazil and Argentina), as well as sending humanitarian aid and engineers through 2004. Peru, after democratic crises from 2000-2001, has also been very active in promoting democratic mechanism within the OAS, and in particular a strong version of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which it championed with strong Canadian support (Cooper 2004, p100).

The OAS has made several key moves to improve its effectiveness in implementing political change and development in the region. In 1991 the Santiago Resolution 1080 committed the organisation to 'a kind of collective defence of democracy' (Rosenberg 2001). The Secretariat has been restructured to improve its effectiveness under the leadership of Cesar Gaviria (then OAS Secretary General until 2004), a former president of Colombia (Rosenberg 2001). Through September- October 2004 Miguel Angel Rodríguez Echeverría of Costa Rica became Secretary General, but due to allegations of corruption in his earlier career as President of Costa Rica from 1998-2002, chose to step down, while from October 2004 Luigi R. Einaudi from the US became Acting Secretary General (Conaway 2004b). In May 2005 Jose Miguel Insulza, formerly Chile's interior minister, became Secretary General, with strong support from centre-left governments, but also from President Chavez of Venezuela, leading to strong initial U.S. opposition (Economist 2005a).

In combination with Resolution 1080, and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS now has strong regulative tools to support core norms. However, strong political consensus, alongside limited economic and military resources, still shape the way these norms are applied. Through 2005-2006 there were calls for the OAS to become more pro-active and interventionist, i.e. an organisation with rapid reaction to crisis and a willingness to use its 'teeth' to deal with those who break these norms. However, alongside states

reluctant to undermine national sovereignty, there has also been concern that such policies in the end may be **driven by particular interests**, e.g. U.S. concerns over Venezuela's foreign policy.

In spite of this progressive agenda, certain **criticisms have been made of the OAS**, including: -

- * It has a **firefighter approach** to dealing with threats to democracy (Cooper & Legler 2001), rather than mobilising enough resources to address underlying problems or causes. As such, it still may be overly reliant on sustained support either from the UNSC, or from great powers such as the U.S., and its policies for promoting democracy remained under-funded and under-powered.

- * That in terms of the defence of democracy, it **lacks real rapid response capability** in relation to crises, e.g. slow reaction to the Paraguayan crisis of 1996 (Cooper & Legler 2001). Likewise, the OAS's limited response to problematic elections in Peru during May 2000 was viewed as a failure to defend democratic processes (Rosenberg 2001). The rapid response problem may also be confounded with cautions against forceful intervention, a policy orientation common to states such as Mexico and Brazil (see above).

- * The OAS has a **'relative scarcity of resources'** in that its budget for 2000 was only around \$87 million, and that many of its members were slow in payment of funds, e.g. as of June 2000 the U.S. was \$35.7 million in arrears, Argentina \$5.3 million, and Brazil 23.8 million (Cooper & Legler 2001). **The U.S. provides some 60% of the regular OAS budget**, and around the same proportion of voluntary funds (Boniface 2002, p368). Bearing in mind the diversification of tasks that the OAS has taken up, this is a serious issue, leading to ad hoc fund-raising system and general limits in capability.

* On this basis, the OAS has been criticised on a **lack of implementation and follow up on the hundreds of projects** and action plans it has mandated (Rosenberg 2001). Areas such as poverty, 'inequality, social exclusion, corruption, and the role of paramilitary groups', for example, have been addressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter (see below), but remain 'untouched by its implementation' (Cooper 2004, p109).

* The OAS has been sometimes been **viewed largely as an instrument of U.S. policies**, but on the same basis it can also be seen as 'a mechanism of **restraint of asymmetrical power** and a safeguard against U.S. intervention' (Rosenberg 2001). This has been somewhat less true in recent years, with mid-level and smaller countries such as Chile, Canada, Peru and Brazil taking strong roles on particular issues. In combination with stronger input from NGOs and civil society (see below), this has suggested **that the OAS is slowly moving towards the 'new multi-lateralism'** that engages diverse groups on different levels (Cooper 2004, p93). Likewise, the slight drift to the left in Latin America, combined with some leverage from Venezuela, has meant that the U.S. has had to seriously re-engage countries such as Chile and potentially Brazil in their foreign policy agenda.

* Though the OAS has now taken on a stronger role in relation to intervening against coups that threaten democracy, it has a **more ambiguous role in relation to the erosion of democracy**, or to constitutional changes that might threaten democracy (Boniface 2002). On this basis, intervention in the case of Venezuela has been problematic. Rather, the **limited mediatory role** the OAS was taken up has been on a voluntary basis in dialogue with the government of President Chavez.

* Although democracy has emerged as a norm within the OAS, **the way this norm is applied may still represent key strategic interests**, e.g. the

cooperation and consent of the U.S. as a major economic and military power within the organisation (see Boniface 2002). On this basis, **IR realists would see the OAS as mainly meeting the needs of its powerful members** in an instrumental fashion, while **normativists see this as a path for shared values while retaining relative autonomy** from individual members (Boniface 2002, pp366-367).

A number of **test cases** can help us further assess the operations of the OAS (see further Boniface 2002): -

1) In **Haiti** on 30th September 1991, General Raoul Cédrès overthrew the elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, leading to **immediate action by the OAS under Resolution 1080** (Boniface 2002, p369). . The OAS imposed an embargo on Haiti (Skidmore & Smith 2000, p300), followed by a passing on of the problem up to the UN Security Council, leading to Resolution 841, imposing an oil and arms embargo on the country, followed by Resolution 940 which allowed the use of force to intervene and restore the elected government (Boniface 2002, p370). The voluntary embargo at first suggested by the OAS was not very effective, until taken up at the UNSC, thereby closing off fuel to the island (Nguyen 2002). On this basis, a U.S. force of circa 20,000 troops took control of the island, returned the government, and saw the disbanding of the Haitian armed forces (Boniface 2002, p370). However, as we shall see, this was not the end of problems for Haiti, with ongoing human rights and poverty problems, as well as riots and associated deaths through March 2005, and seriously problems in elections through early 2006 (looked at further later weeks). However, the 1990s **intervention showed strong support for the OAS and its democratic principles**. U.S. intervention could only be partly explained by domestic political issue of reducing the flow of Haitian 'boat people' (Boniface 2002, p371; see further Orenstein 1998). Political instability continued through 2002, leading to a second round of intensified international concern through 2003-2006. The **OAS and CARICOM**

from January 2002 once again called for the international community to help Haiti, and agreed to continue its mediation between the Haitian government and opposition groups that formed the Democratic Convergence (*PR Newswire* 2002). **Fresh violence continued to undermine stability through late 2002 down to early 2006**, driven in part by mass protests of those for and against the Aristide government, working along dividing lines set up since 2000. Through March 2004, Aristide lost control of the island and was forced to leave (first to the Central African Republic and then to Jamaica, with international peacekeepers (first from France, the US, Chile and Canada) mediating stability (*NotiCen* 2004a) between former opposition groups, armed militia, former military groups, business elites, former police, and ordinary people hoping for a margin improvement of terrible conditions. The issue is **highly controversial**, with the overthrow of Aristide being technically a coup, and claims of engineered support for opposition groups from overseas, especially the U.S. and various aid agencies (see Wilentz 2004 for one view). On this basis there had been a call for the OAS to investigate the removal Aristide: -

Venezuela has asked for the Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate the circumstances of Aristide's removal. . . . Under this resolution, the OAS would ask the UN Security Council to investigate the removal of Aristide.

Valero also took the OAS to task for failing to invoke the Democratic Charter and for failing to convoke a meeting of the Consejo Permanente [Permanent Council] to deal with the issue. He said, "The Venezuelan government expects that, in an urgent manner, the Consejo Permanente of the OAS meet, with the objective of considering and adopting needed measures in the face of the grave situation of political instability and constitutional rupture in Haiti." (*NotiCen* 2004a).

Through 2004-2006 both aid and political re-rehabilitation projects had limited effect, leading to **delayed and then violent electoral processes through early 2006**, with both the OAS and UN mission (MINUSTAH) having problems in setting up the conditions for registration and voting

(*NotiCen* 2006). In February 2006 Rene Preval was 'declared the winner' but only after a 'deal' was reached over spoiled ballot papers - the electoral council 'declared Mr Preval the winner with 51.15% of the vote, following a decision to divide more than 80,000 blank ballots among all 33 presidential candidates' (BBC 2006a).

2) In **Peru**, through April 1992, former President Alberto Fujimori sought to remove the Peruvian Congress, 'displace the judiciary', arrest opposition members, and reduce civil liberties, resulting in an OAS mission through May 1992 (Boniface 2002, p372). Parliamentary elections followed, a compromise formulation that satisfied the requirements of the OAS but did not end political controversy in Peru. In this case, the U.S. had interests in supporting a regime that had to some degree reduced drug production and had fought against the Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) insurgents (Boniface 2002, p373). The U.S. had no wish to break diplomatic relations, but was willing to threaten the withholding of aid to push Fujimori back towards a democratic compromise (Boniface 2002, p373). The later collapse of the Fujimori government led through 2000-2001 led to the **return of democratic government, then to a dialogue process that helped transition to new elections in April 2001. Peru was thereafter willing to strengthen the functions of the OAS.** (Cooper 2004, p98).

3) In **Guatemala** during May 1993, President Jorge Serrano Elias sought to dissolve Congress, remove the judiciary, and suspend the constitution, but this was widely opposed by a strong 'domestic opposition', leading to an **OAS threatening economic sanctions** (Boniface 2002, pp373-374). Aid was suspended by the U.S., and along with strong internal support, a congressional election led to a return to constitutional procedures (Boniface 2002, p374).

4) In **Paraguay** during 1996 a civil president was elected (Juan Carlos Wasmosy), but was soon in conflict with General Lino César Oviedo -

the OAS immediately moved to condemn the general, with strong criticism coming from the U.S. and Brazil (Boniface 2002, p374-375). Another attempted coup in 2000 was also averted, once again in part due to pressure from the OAS, U.S. and Brazil (Boniface 2002, p375). The next leader, Lius Gonzalez 'became president in March 1999 at the age of 52 after Raul Cubas Grau resigned over his association with General Lino Cesar Oviedo, who was widely believed to have been behind the assassination of Cubas's rival in the ruling Colorado Party, Vice-President Luis Mario Argana' (BBC 2003), with Oviedo being arrested in June 2004. Gonazales, who was President from 1999-2003, was under investigation in March 2004 for possible corruption (UPI 2004a), while from February 2005 'President Nicanor Duarte promises a crackdown on organised crime following the kidnapping and murder of the daughter of former president Raul Cubas' (BBC 2005)

These are only partial successes but do indicate a genuine commitment to democracy. However, the actions of major states (the U.S. and Brazil, for example), can moderate the means and outcome of such interventions (Boniface 2002). Likewise, recent instability in Haiti, Peru (until recently), Venezuela and Paraguay indicate that selective interventions are not enough to ensure national stability (see lectures 10-12). Indeed, the OAS remains one medium level institutional actor among many, though one whose agenda has been able to draw in a serious assessment of needed reforms for the region.

Recent areas of activity and debates for the OAS include: -

- 1) Jamaica has urged the OAS to become more proactive on socio-economic matters, alongside its political success (*Caribbean News Agency* 2001). This would extend to an OAS role in advising on development issues, an issue taken up in part through OAS agencies such as the *Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD)*, which was established at the beginning of 2000 to promote

better 'cooperation between its member states and to enhance partnerships with the private sector and civil society' (OAS 2005).

2) OAS contributions helped the development of a **bi-national border development plan**, helping 'education, social and productive development, environmental conservation, and the economic integration' of the borders between Honduras and Nicaragua in Central America (*Americas* 2002). The OAS, with financial contributions from countries such as Norway and Canada, has begun **operations to clear and destroy landmines**, e.g. with successful operations in Nicaragua clearing 75% of affected areas (*Americas* 2003).

3) Through mid-2002, 25 (out of 34) nations of the OAS ratified **the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption**, a process begun in 1996 (*Xinhua* 2002a), followed by a total ratification by 31 members in mid-2004. The countries

'agreed to strengthen cooperation among law enforcement authorities, deny safe haven to corrupt officials, strengthen domestic laws related to extradition and the seizure of assets, and promote legislation to allow repatriation of assets that have been illegally derived from public funds, among other measures.' (Conaway 2004)

4) OAS investigations into **arms smuggling**, which remains a major regional concern, with small arms readily reaching Colombian rebels from wide networks including groups in Mexico, Guatemala, Panama and Nicaragua (Johnson 2003).

5) **Continued efforts to address poverty**, e.g. at the High-Level Meeting on Poverty, Equity, and Social Inclusion, in October 2003, in a meeting which involved the Inter-American Development Bank, the OAS Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CEPCIDI), and Venezuela's Ambassador to the OAS, Jorge Valero, plus a range of other organisations. (*Americas*

2004a) In general, the OAS recognises the **linkages between poverty and 'problems associated with democratic consolidation'** (Cooper 2004, p97).

3. Summit of the Americas and Other Activity Groups

A number of different organisations and dialogue processes have been set up to articulate regional needs beyond that expressed through the OAS. The **Rio Group** (sometimes abbreviated as GRIO) was formed in 1986 (at a meeting in Rio de Janeiro) with eight members. Members include 'Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay and a representative from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)' and from 2000 'Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua' will participate in GRIO as full and individual members' (Brazil 2001). It has expanded 'to include almost all of the Latin American and Caribbean states and became the preeminent organizational voice on the new agenda of issues,' and now has 19 members (Atkins 1999, p33; Arango 2001). From 1991 the **Rio Group has continued dialogue with the EU** through regular meetings of foreign ministers (Atkins 1999, p196). As noted by Cooper and Legler, it also has a **strong pro-democracy orientation but also sought to moderate U.S. influence:** -

In this diffuse environment, the Rio Group has emerged beside the OAS as a particularly important prodemocracy agent. Established in 1986 from the merger of the Contadora Group (Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia) and its support group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay), the Rio Group comprises the majority of Latin American countries. It traces its origins, to a great extent, to the widespread perception that the OAS was a U.S. dominated body, possessing little autonomy on issues such as the Central American crisis of the 1980s. The defining trait of the Rio Group has remained its presence as a forum for dialogue between Latin American countries without U.S. participation and interference. Much like the OAS, the Rio Group has set democracy as a criterion of membership, with the threat of suspension for any interruption in democratic rule. (Cooper & Legler 2001).

The Rio group began with a **concern to establish peace and security** in their own region, but soon moved to a wider role in coordinating policies in the United Nations, and in supporting 'multilateralism as the vehicle that would most effectively regulate the new international reality by seeking a humane and just globalization that would operate within a framework of expanding democratization' (Arango 2001). Objectives of the organisation include: -

- to expand and systematize political cooperation among the member states.
- to examine international issues which may be of interest and coordinate common positions on these issues.
- to promote more efficient operation and coordination of Latin American cooperation and integration organizations.
- to present appropriate solutions to the problems and conflicts affecting the region.
- to provide momentum, through dialogue and cooperation, to the initiatives and actions undertaken to improve inter-American relations.
- to explore jointly new fields of cooperation which enhance economic, social, scientific and technological development. (Brazil 2001)

Another organisation which has emerged without U.S. involvement has been the **Iberoamerican Community of Nations and its Summits**, including Latin America, Spain and Portugal, first holding a Ibero-american Summit of heads of state in Guadalajara, Mexico in July 1991, followed by **annual meetings**. These meetings **include Cuba**, whose economic opening has been encouraged by Spain (followed by France, Canada and Germany, with some limited support from Venezuela and Brazil, see lecture 4). This is one of the main forums in which Cuba has full membership. Through 2004, it sought to address issues such as corruption, transparency, greater cooperation with the private sector, and 'to promote intraregional trade integration between Central American and the Caribbean within the framework of other multilateral agreements' (US Newswire 2004).

A major hemispheric system began to emerge since 1994 with the **Summit of the Americas**, launched under U.S. initiatives. It has begun to develop its own institutional structure, and although it generally cooperates with the OAS, it is sometimes viewed as **challenging the primary role of the OAS** in hemispheric

affairs (Rosenberg 2001). It is **essentially a meeting of heads of democratic governments**, but also involves ministerial and follow-up-meetings. The first conference was held in Miami 1994, followed by the Santiago Summit of 1998, and then the summit in Quebec City, Canada, in April 2001, and then in Monterrey, Mexico in January 2004, and a divisive meeting in Argentina in November 2005. It now engages 34 countries in North, South and Central America (with the exception of Cuba).

The **Miami Summit** of the Americas led to a plan of Action addressing 'the economic, social, political, and environmental aspects of sustainability', with a strong input from the Agenda 21 sustainability process that had begun with the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 (Rosenberg 2001). The Miami Plan of Action contained key initiative on **biodiversity, energy use, and pollution prevention**, but also began the idea of a **free trade area** that would embrace all of the Americas, taking further the original idea of the 'Enterprise for the Americas Initiative' of 1990 (Carranza 2000). This moved the main agenda of the Summits towards the promotion of free trade, and in particular the extension of the idea of the **Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)**, hoping to open up an area of over 800 million people in a market with a total GDP of approx. \$11 trillion. Formal negotiations on this began in the **second Summit of the Americas in Santiago in 1998**, with 34 nations participating. This project would not just involve removing barriers to trade in goods, but also open all service areas, plus **effect that way nations can make decisions on environmental law, labour law, health and safety and food regulations** (Gunnell 2001). It also included controversial proposals for methods whereby private companies can sue governments for the loss of income created by government actions, even if such government actions are legal or in the public interest, i.e. ideas similar to the 'multilateral agreement on investment', though this was later limited (for similar mechanisms and law cases under NAFTA rules, see Gunnell 2001). On this basis, the Summit, like many other international meetings, has been **met by strong anti-globalisation protests**, e.g. the Quebec meeting in 2001. Just prior to the Summit, the **People's Summit of the Americas**, was held for the four days before sponsored by the Hemispheric Social Alliance,

representing an 'international coalition of labor, human rights, environmental and religious organizations' (Schaeffer-Duffy 2001). Brazil has also indicated that it is concerned by the way such FTAA proposal might undermine its current social programs (Gunnell 2001), and favours Mercosur as a model of regional economic cooperation (see later lectures).

President's Bush's vision of U.S. leadership of Pan-America goes much further than the idea of a free-trade structure based on the FTAA: -

In Bush's vision, FTAA would be firmly rooted in free markets. Indeed, the president and his allies see FTAA as a body that will tend to entrench free markets in the Western hemisphere through the magic of "jurisdictional competition." This is the theory, advanced by the distinguished legal theorist John O. McGinnis, that free trade compels nations that have chosen different systems of tax, welfare, and regulation to compete with one another. It creates a marketplace of governments. Businesses and taxpayers vote with their feet by moving from one jurisdiction (i.e., country) to another in order to enjoy the system of tax and regulation that best suits them. That system "wins" that attracts the most high-earners and businesses and so creates the most jobs and prosperity. And experience suggests that in this marketplace the winners tend to be low-tax, lightly regulated economies with modest levels of social benefits. The Bush vision is of the Americas not only integrated by free trade, but also transformed by it into successful market economies. (O'Sullivan 2001)

If such **interdependence** were to occur, then the Americas would emerge as a free market, democratic system loosely allied to the U.S. through shared interests and the need for trade and an open global market. It would also be able to compete with East Asia and the European Union in global terms. However, the **hidden costs of such competition, potential dislocation, and low priorities given to social and environmental areas** need to be carefully considered, e.g. in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (see earlier lectures). **More developed countries, with strong legal and financial structures, are more likely to be able to benefit from such a system.** Through 2001-2005 the FTAA initiative has slowed, in part as security concerns came to the forefront in regional policy, but also due to strong opposition from Brazil and Venezuela (see below).

The **relationship between the Summit of the OAS remains complex**: the OAS has formal coordination with the Summits, and formally follows up on some its agenda. However, the overall organisation and administration of the Summits is not done by the OAS, largely because of the view that the OAS is too much reliant on consensus and tends to lack enough formal expertise to run the 'new' issues that the Summit needs to address (Rosenberg 2001). The OAS has been asked by the Summit to follow up ongoing issues such as human rights, corruption, terrorism, and democracy, thus providing a strong support role. The OAS Unit for Sustainable Development and the Environment in particular has been involved in support for Summit agenda on development (Rosenberg 2001). However, there still remains **a fear that this will lead to more responsibilities for the OAS but with less control**, limited resources, and a lack of a leadership role. In the worst-case scenario, the OAS becomes a place where problems are located without expectation of solution. To counter this, the OAS created formal groups to coordinate with the Summits, including the Committee on Inter-American Summits Management in the Permanent Council (of the OAS), and the Office of Summit Follow-Up (Rosenberg 2001). In this context, the OAS has also moved to draft an Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, preparing it for the June 2002 General Assembly of the OAS held in Barbados, where 30 of 34 nations signed it (Montes 2002; *Xinhua* 2002b).

The **Summit and the OAS have also tried to engage civil society** in a consultation system with thousands of civil society representatives, first developed through the Santa Cruz Summit on Sustainable Development in December 1996. Initially coordinated through the North-South Center of Miami University and the Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano of Quito in Ecuador (Rosenberg 2001). This led to **the Inter-American Strategy for Public Participation in Sustainable Development Decision-Making (ISP)**, but the role of civil society in these processes is not without controversy (see Shamsie 2000). It has been argued that in such a system it is hard to arrive at clear objectives, let alone set deadlines and measure outcomes, since the process

becomes more conflictual and there is sometimes a 'breakdown of the technical preparation process' (Rosenberg 2001) as goals become more ambitious. However, in the formation of the final structure of **the Inter-American Democratic Charter, submissions from 8,000 civil society groups and NGOs were considered**, allowing a wider 'ownership of the Charter' (Cooper 2004, p105).

It is not surprising in this context that **the Summits of the Americas also suffer from strong public criticism**. The massive agenda set up by the various Plans of Action has led to a continuing 'gap between words and deeds' (Rosenberg 2001), resulting in lack of credibility. Likewise, with its strong support for the FTAA idea and for various free trade and neo-liberal agenda, the Summits themselves have been increasingly subject to **protests from the anti-globalisation movement**. Cautions from Mercosur and Brazil on the FTAA, may have helped reduce the leading role of the Summits (Rosenberg 2001). In the worst case scenario the **NAFTA and Mercosur styles of integration may be competing models**, dooming the FTAA to failure unless Mercosur disintegrates (Carranza 2000), or radically changes its bargaining position, which seems unlikely in the short to medium term. Thus, for example, in the areas of deep integration such as 'intellectual property rights, government procurement, and competition policy', the Mercosur system is less intensified than NAFTA (Carranza 2000), allowing areas such as services and telecommunications to open up more slowly.

Through 2000-2006, debate within the U.S., partly based on the NAFTA and CAFTA experience, was **somewhat ambiguous towards the FTAA project**, perhaps wanting it as 'regionalist option rather than following a clear regionalist policy' (Mace & Gordon 1999, in Carranza 2000). President Bush, in an address to the OAS in April 2001, was still optimistic: -

We must extend the benefits of education in this hemisphere. Both development and democracy in the long term depend on education. We must build the skill and reward the hopes of all our people. And we must affirm our commitment to complete negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas by January 2005. . . . It will

make our hemisphere the largest free trade area in the world, encompassing 34 countries and 800 million people. (Bush 2001)

Those in favour of the FTAA had hoped that it would meet its target date of 2005 (Gunnell 2001), but different models exist for patterns of integration and this target is very unlikely. Another round of **negotiations has begun through 2002-2005, with countries proposing different levels of tariff reduction as part of this process**, a process being put forward through a meeting at Panama in February 2003. Proposals have to deal 'with market access for industrial goods, agricultural products, services, investment and governmental procurement' (*Xinhua* 2003b). Relations with Mercosur and Brazil will still need to be resolved before this can be completed, with ongoing negotiations with Brazil over the speed and extend of the lifting of tariffs (*Xinhua* 2003a).

U.S. proposal included a five-year, phased reduction of tariffs on some products, but still includes issues of concern to Brazil: -

The U.S. has proposed eliminating tariffs on textiles and other products imported from Latin America as part of a Bush Administration effort to restart negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). Congress granted the White House fast-track authority last year for negotiating trade agreements, but economic turmoil in Argentina and Brazil had slowed FTAA negotiations. The U.S. proposal would eliminate tariffs on imported textiles by 2010, five years after the FTAA is scheduled to take effect--provided Latin America countries do the same. The U.S. proposed a 10-year tariff phaseout for citrus and sugar, however, two products for which Brazil has been eager to gain access to U.S. markets. (Sissell 2003)

Chile had been more positive, suggesting a '73-percent drop in tariffs on products exchanged within the region' (*Xinhua* 2003b), perhaps on the basis of more positive long-term trade negotiations with the U.S. In effect, the U.S. has augmented its NAFTA zone with a number of bilateral agreements in Central and South America, with free trade arrangements finalised with Chile in 2004, allowing a total of 83% of Latin American exports (\$176 billion) to enter the U.S. duty free (Bush 2004). However, Cuba has strongly criticised such programs (from which it has and will be excluded), while President Lula

da Silva of Brazil committed himself during his election speeches to participate, but 'adopt a "tough stance" during the negotiations' (*UPI* 2002).

The **January 2004 Summit of the Americas**, held in Monterrey, Mexico, was perhaps **even more divisive**, with strong differences of viewpoint emerging between the U.S., Brazil and Venezuela, and between Chile and Bolivia. In general, there was **north-south** split on many issues: -

But if the northern part of the Americas seems to be making up, the summit exposed the gulf between north and south. The United States wanted trade to be a central part of the conference agenda, and a commitment to do a deal on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the beginning of 2005 to be in the final communique. Brazil, Venezuela and others didn't want to talk about pan-American trade at all; Brazil wants to secure greater economic integration in South America first.

Eventually the attendees pledged themselves to the FTAA, but not to a specific date, and several made plain their objections to the Washington model of free trade. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil dwelt on the "abyss" between the rich and the poor, and said that trade should be more "fair and equal". Nestor Kirchner of Argentina fulminated against the International Monetary Fund for burdening his country with promises it could not keep--arguments that reflect a disenchantment with economic liberalism across South America, which has informed the rise of leaders such as Lula. (*Economist* 2004b)

The main area of cooperation that emerged in the 2004 Summit was a **multilateral cooperation to support for the fragile democracy of Bolivia** (*Economist* 2004b).

The **November 2005 Summit of the Americas** (held in Mar Del Plata, Argentina) saw a strong but divisive effort by President Bush to relaunch the FTAA project, suggesting that it was the best way in the long term to **reduce poverty** and enhance democracies. He was also concerned to reduce the influence of President Chavez of Venezuela, and any indirect influence from Cuba. In end, President Bush accepted Brazil's view that any move towards the FTAA would need to be preceded by successful WTO talks, with serious progression on opening up agricultural exports, a position supported by

Argentina (*Australian* 2006a; *Australian* 2006c). Lula and Bush made a joint statement promising 'to promote improved governance, regional and trans-regional dialogues, development and poverty alleviation (*Australian* 2006a). Chavez claim that he had 'buried' the FTAA, however, can not be fully accepted since **though the FTAA has been delayed as an agenda item, the issue of free trade was one of the main issues discussed** in the Summit (*Australian* 2006c). The next Summit is scheduled to occur in Trinidad and Tobago in late 2008 or early 2009.

In contrast, different models have emerged out of the Mercosur, the Common Market of the South, and its wider engagement to create a possible SAFTA, South American Free Trade Area that might be an alternative model for integration. Economic regionalism has come to the fore with southern cone intense engagement in **Mercosur** (Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur or the **Common Market of the South**, negotiated from 1990, called Mercado Común del Sul, Mercosul in Brazil). Mercosur's members include Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, while Chile and Bolivia are associate members (Sissell 2001; Johnson 2001; Falcoff 2000; Atkins 1999, p38). Based on the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, the organisation had both economic aims, at first towards the creation of a **customs union** with shared external tariffs by 2006, as well as a distinct political agenda in reducing conflict between Brazil and Argentina (Roett 1999, p1; Pereira 1999, p9). A 'common external tariff was agreed at the end of 1994, with general exceptions until 2001 for Uruguay and Paraguay and the exceptions for all on some sensitive items, including special arrangements for the automotive and sugar industries, until 2006' (Gordon 2001, p215). The organisation was also based on a **general trade liberalisation program, with the eventual aim of conditional common market** (but with exceptions in sensitive areas, leading to average tariffs in computers and telecommunications of around 16%, coordination of macroeconomic policy, and sectoral agreements to avoid damaging competition among members in particular industries (Pereira 1999, pp10-12; Carvalho 2004). There have also been efforts to create shared conditions for regional investment, with guidelines for dispute resolution, while by 2004 some 95% of

intra-regional trade was without tariff costs (Pereira 1999, p12; Carvalho 2004). We will look at Mercosur and its related agenda in later weeks. In large measure it is a Brazil and Southern cone development that has been championed as an alternative and slower form of local regionalism.

4. The Future of the Hemispheric Dream

Latin American regionalism has been moderated by **global level concerns** (terrorism and poverty), international agencies (the UN, UNCTAD, and the WTO), as well as by new **inter-regional patterns of cooperation**. Thus both East Asia and the European Union have emerged as major trading partners with many Latin American states, and have in recent years begun to move to wider patterns of cooperation, e.g. the development of a **Framework agreement between the EU and Mercosur**, a process that the EU had already completed with Chile in 1996 and Mexico in 1997 (Atkins 1999, p120; see above). European nations have long been interested in the fate of their former colonies (and current small territories) in Latin America. Thus in 1984 the Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA) was formed (Atkins 1999, p118), while from 1974 the EC signed the Lomé Convention to support export prices from these regions (e.g. of sugar) and aid development in former colonies in Asia, the Pacific and Caribbean. Though the Lomé Convention has since been phased out through the year 2000, a new **ongoing trade, governance and human rights dialogue** has been established (Le Rue 2000).

The has culminated in a **wider dialogue process which the EU, Latin American and Caribbean leaders launched** in June 1999, with an agenda addressing human rights, as well as cooperation in the political, economic, social and scientific areas: -

- the reinforcement of trade and economic relation through the use of existing trade pacts between the three regions, and the preparation of other Agreements;
- cooperation against organised crime and other criminal activities;

- the elaboration of instruments to fight corruption;
- implementation of cooperation programmes to respond efficiently to natural disasters;
- reinforcement of cooperation on investment in tourism in all three regions; the implementation of health and education programmes to combat extreme poverty and social exclusion;
- implementation of programmes to enhance cultural and linguistic identity;
- initiatives to boost scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges (*European Report 1999*)

Improved relations have thus developed among Mercosur, the EU, the Andean and Community of Nations Andean Community and Chile were negotiated through the late 1990s (*European Report 1999*). Through March 2004, **negotiations proceeded again for a proposed Free Trade Area among Mercosur and the EU**, with hopes that negotiations can be completed quite quickly. At present, 'around 25 percent of *Mercosur* exports go to *EU*. Trade volume between the two blocs stood at 36.12 billion US dollars in 2002 with a surplus of 5.23 billion dollars in favor of the South American bloc.' (*Xinhua 2004a*). Efforts at a free trade agreement among the EU and Mercosur were somewhat delayed through October 2004, but a standing commission was set up in November 2004 (*Xinhua 2004b*) but negotiations were extremely slow through 2005.

East Asian nations, especially Japan and China, have also begun to develop a serious interest in Latin America, mainly for trade and partly for political purposes. Japan in particular has been interested in trade with Latin America:

-

Latin America became Japan's principal postwar emigration outlet, with Brazil the most prominent recipient. About a million Japanese migrated to South America from the end of World War II to the early 1980s. About half the total number settled in Brazil, with some 80,000 in Peru, 30,000 in Argentina, and 10,000 in Bolivia. Trade relations, virtually non-existent in the 1950s, increased from only \$600,000 in 1960 to \$15 billion in the early 1980s: they were supported by substantial investments and

financial and technical assistance. Japanese communities in South America facilitated the trading relationships.

Japanese economic expansion in Latin America rested on a striking economic complementarity, involving trade, investment, and technical and financial assistance. Japan was required to import raw materials and food, whereas certain Latin American economies needed to export them; Japan had to export large quantities of its own manufactured goods, and Latin America provided markets. Japan aimed its investment, as well as financial and technical assistance, at developing Latin American raw materials and agricultural products for export to Japan; the exchange earned was then devoted to purchasing Japanese goods. In this closed process, Latin Americans received capital and technology. (Atkins 1999, p129).

These policies thus fitted in with an effort to support comprehensive security for Japan within the global system by diversifying sources for imports, expanding markets, and retaining its edge as an exporter of technological products (sometimes termed technonationalism). **Japan** has also been active in contributing funds to the Inter-American Development Banks (over \$500 million), and has also had an observer mission to the OAS (Atkins 1999, p130). These trends culminated with the creation of an **East Asia and Latin America Forum (EALAF)**, bringing together interested countries in 2000. Begun 'by Chile and Singapore, EALAF comprises Latin American countries, 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand' (*Japan Policy and Politics* 2000; see further the Forum of this group, FEALAC, in Lecture 7). Through 2005, an emerging web of regional and bilateral arrangements has suggested **an emerging pattern of free trade partly linked into the growing Chinese economy**, with China taking a stronger role in Venezuela, Bolivia and Panama, but as different vision of the future will need further development through 2006-2010 (Bussey 2005).

In large measure, it seems that South American states have established themselves as strong players in a wider Western-hemispheric pattern of governance that is beginning to emerge, while beginning to build inter-regional bridges. But **this pattern of multilateral cooperation remains highly reliant on North American participation**, particularly the United States and through the

1990s with growing Canadian participation (see above). This lead us back to the tension of whether new pattens of economic interdependence in fact lead to de facto U.S. leadership, relative power preponderance, and strong U.S. funding (see Boniface 2002). At present, most Latin American states are betting that an open market agenda will eventually lead to greater national wealth, but by itself this will not be enough to ensure political stability and social security. The model may need to be moderated by the pressing social dilemmas of countries such as Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, and by the foreign policy agenda of countries such as Brazil and Venezuela. Through 2005-2006, **no absolute split in policy** in the OAS and the Summit of the Americas has occurred in groups focused around U.S. verses Venezuelan views, but Chavez' alternative agenda (the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) has created enough debate to slow down free trade agenda driven from Washington (Australian 2005d). There may also be a temptation for Washington to use the democratic agenda in the OAS to pressure Venezuela, an area in which countries such as Chile remain cautious. In particular, any tendency to 'militarise' these problems and treat them as conflicts to be won may tend to undermine the developmental agenda of many regional states (see Isacson 2001). We can also **question whether the current overlapping system of organisation and summits provides secure, ongoing and strong governance in which there can convergence among these different powers and models.**

5. Bibliography and Resources

Resources

The *Summit of the Americas Information System* provides useful information and documents on the Summit and related processes at <http://www.summit-americas.org/default.htm>

Useful information and publications can be accessed through the official Website of the *Organisation of American States* (OAS) at <http://www.oas.org/>

The *Inter-American Democratic Charter* of the OAS will be found at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm

The homepage of the *Inter-American Development Bank*, with a range of articles on economic and development issues, will be found at <http://www.iadb.org/>

Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano has a Spanish language website monitoring a wide range of developmental and political issues, globally and within Latin America. Located at <http://www.fulano.org/>

Voluntary Further Reading (Please read one or more of the following if you wish to take these issues further.)

ATKINS, G. Pope *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999

BONIFACE, Dexter "Is There a Democratic Norm in the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States", *Global Governance*, 8, 2002, pp365-381 [Access via Ebsco Database]

COOPER, Andrew F. "The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism", *International Studies Perspectives*, 5 no. 1, February 2004, pp92-113 [Access via Bond Library Databases]

COOPER, Andrew & LEGLER, Thomas "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43 no. 1, Spring 2001, pp103-126 [Access via Infotrac Database]

FRIEDEN, Jeffrey A. et al. (eds.) *Modern Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy*, Boulder, Westview, 2000

NotiCen "EL Salvador First to Implement CAFTA, and First to Feel the Heavy Hand of Its New Partner", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, 52 March 2006 [Access via Infotrac Database]

- NGUYEN, Thi Hai Yen "Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution", *Journal of International Affairs*, 55 no. 2, Spring 2002, pp463-484 [Access via Bond Library Databases]
- SANTANDER, Sebastian " EU-MERCOSUR interregionalism: facing up to the South American crisis and the emerging free trade area of the Americas", 7 no. 4, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Winter 2002, pp491-504 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- TULCHIN, Joseph S. & ESPACH, Ralph H. (eds.) *Latin America in the New International System*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001

References

- Agra Europe* " Mercosur and Andean Pact strike new trade deal", April 8, 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Americas* "Building a Binational Border", 54 no. 2, March/April 2002, pp52-53 [Access via Ebsco Database]
- Americas* "Mine Free Americas", 55 no. 1, Jan/Feb 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]
- Americas* "Campaign Against Poverty", *Americas*, 56 no. 1, Jan-Feb 2004a, p54 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Australian* "Bush Tells Americas to Follow US Vision", 8 November 2005a, p8
- Australian* "Fujimori Arrested in Chilean Hotel", 8 November 2005b, p8
- Australian* "Summit Fails to Agree on Free Trade", 7 November 2005c, p13
- Australian* "US Gets a Dose of Latin Chavismo", 7 November 2005d, p13
- ANDRES, Oppenheimer "Seeking a 'New Path'", *Hemisphere*, 8 no. 2, Winter/Spring 1998 [Access via Ebsco Database]
- ARANGO, Andres Pastrana "The Rio Group and the Millennium Summit", *UN Chronicle*, 37 no. 3, 2000, pp53-54 [Access via Proquest Database]
- ATKINS, G. Pope *Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999
- AUGUST, Arnold *Democracy in Cuba and the 1997-1998 Elections*, La Habana, Editorial José Martí, 1999
- BBC* "Country profile: Paraguay", BBC Online, 11 March 2003 [Internet Access]
- BBC* "Timeline Paraguay", BBC News, 14 December 2005a [Internet Access via <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1224216.stm>]
- BBC* "Election Official 'Flees Haiti'", BBC Online, 1 February 2006a [Internet Access]
- BOEHM, Peter M. & HERNANDEZ-ROY, Christopher "Multilateralism in the Americas", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 7 no. 2, Winter 1999 [Web Access at <http://www.summit-americas.org/Summit-Papers/Multilateralism-Americas-CFP.htm>]

- BONIFACE, Dexter "Is There a Democratic Norm in the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States", *Global Governance*, 8, 2002, pp365-381 [Access via Ebsco Databases]
- Brazil "The Rio Group", Foreign Office of Brazil, 2001 [Internet Access via <http://www.mre.gov.br/cdbrasil/itamaraty/web/ingles/relext/mre/orgreg/index.htm>]
- BUSH, George W. "Remarks to the Organization of American States", *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 37 no. 16, 23 April 2001, pp620-622
- BUSH, George W. "Remarks at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Special Summit of the Americas in Monterrey", *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 40 no. 3, 19 January 2004, pp62-64 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- BUSSEY, Janes "Trade negotiations are everywhere, but can they reach fruition? (Special Advertising Supplement)", *Foreign Policy*, no. 146, Jan-Feb 2005, ppS8-14 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Caribbean News Agency* "Jamaica Urges More Hemispheric Attention to Socio-Economic Matters", 21 November 2001 [Access via Ebsco Database]
- CARRANZA, Mario E. "The Americas in Transition (Review)", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 42 no. 2, Summer 2000, pp150-155
- CARRANZA, Mario F. "Can Mercosur survive? Domestic and international constraints on Mercosur", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp67-104 [Access via Infotrac database]
- CARVALHO, Fatima Lampreia "From Mercosul to FTAA's: Towards A Polycentric Politics", SHSS Lecture, Bond University, 2004
- COMPA, Lance "International Labor Rights and NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement", *LASA Forum*, Summer 1999 [Internet Access via <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/summer1999.htm>]
- CONAWAY, Janelle "Spotlight on Indigenous Rights", *Americas*, 53 no. 4, July/August 2001a [Access via Proquest Database]
- CONAWAY, Janelle "Charting a Democratic Charter", *Americas*, 53 no. 5, September-October 2001b, pp54-55 [Access via Proquest Database]
- CONAWAY, Janelle "Charting indigenous rights", *Americas*, 55 no. 3, May-June 2003, p53 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- CONAWAY, Janelle "Confronting corruption", *Americas*, 56 no. 5, Sept-Oct 2004, p55 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- CONAWAY, Janelle "OAS Secretary General Resigns", *Americas*, 56 no. 6, Nov-Dec 2004, p52 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- COOPER, Andrew F. "The Making of the Inter-American Democratic Charter: A Case of Complex Multilateralism", *International Studies Perspectives*, 5 no. 1, February 2004, pp92-113

- COOPER, Andrew & LEGLER, Thomas "The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43 no. 1, Spring 2001, pp103-126 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- CORRALES, Javier "Strong Societies, Weak Parties: Regime Change in Cuba and Venezuela in the 1950s", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43 no. 2, Summer 2001, pp81-113 [Access via BU Library Databases]
- Economist* "The Americas: High on Words - Summitry in Latin America", 24 November 2001, p38
- Economist* "If the Shooting Stops, Haiti", March 20, 2004a, p39 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Economist* "Loveless Brothers; The Summit of the Americas", 17 January 2004b, p30 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Economist* "Leading from the South: The Organisation of American States", 7 May 2005a, p35 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- European Report* "EU/Latin America/Caribbean: First Tripartite Summit Launches New Strategic Partnership", 30 June 1999 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- FALCOFF, Mark "Regionalist Momentum in the Southern Cone", *Orbis*, Summer 2000 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- FRIEDEN, Jeffry A. et al. (eds.) *Modern Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy*, Boulder, Westview, 2000
- GUNNELL, Barbara "Trade Winds Threaten a Hurricane (Summit of the Americas)", *New Statesman*, 23 April 2001 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- GWYNNE, Robert N. & KAY, Cristobal *Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity*, Cambridge, CUP, 1999
- HETTNE, Bjorn *The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development*, Basingstoke, Macmillan in association with UNU/WIDER, 2000
- HUDSON, Rex A. (eds.) *Chile: A Country Study*, Washington, Library of Congress, 1994 [Internet Access via <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cltoc.html>]
- HUDSON, Valerie (ed.) *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Boulder, L. Rienner Publishers, 1997
- HURST, Andrew "Bush Lays Down Tough Terms for Aid to Poor", *I-Won News*, 22 March 2002 [Internet Access]
- ISACSON, Adam "Militarizing Latin American Policy", *Foreign Policy*, 6 no. 21, May 2001 [Internet Access via <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/>]
- Japan Policy and Politics* "Kono Offers to Take Part in E. Asia-Latin America Forum", Sept 18, 2000 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- JOHNSON, Kenneth L. "Critical Debates: Regionalism Redux? The Prospects for Cooperation in the Americas", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43 no. 3, Fall 2001, pp121-138 [Access via Proquest Database, BU Library]
- JOHNSON, Tim "Arms Dealers Flourish in Central America", *Miami Herald*, 31 January 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]

- KOUROUS, George "Would Latin America Be Better Off If Washington Just Left it Alone?", *Foreign Policy in Focus*, 15 March 2002 [Internet Access via ISACSON, Adam "Militarizing Latin American Policy", *Foreign Policy*, 6 no. 21, May 2001 [Internet Access via <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/americas/commentary>]
- LAM, Maivan Clech " Remembering the country of their birth: indigenous peoples and territoriality", *Journal of International Affairs*, 57 no. 2, Spring 2004, pp129-151 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Latin American Institute* "CAFTA Negotiations off to a Bumpy Start", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, 6 February 2003 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- LE RUE, Sophie "EU-ACP Relations: A New Momentum?", *Oneworld Guides*, 2000 [Internet Access via <http://www.oneworld.org/europe/en/guides/lome/>]
- MACE, Gordon & BELANGER, Miguel (eds.) *The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999
- MASSEY, Douglas S. "Undocumented Migration in the Context of NAFTA", *LASA Forum*, Summer 1998 [Internet Access via <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/massey.htm>]
- McLARTY, Mack & FARNSWORTH, Eric "The Future of Your Trade in the Americas Hangs on the US Response to the Summit in Quebec City", *World Trade*, 14 no. 8, August 2001, pp30-32 [Access via Proquest Database]
- MONTES, Javier "Tackling Terrorism", *Americas*, 54 no. 2, March-April 2002, p52 [Access via Proquest Database]
- NGUYEN, Thi Hai Yen "Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution", *Journal of International Affairs*, 55 no. 2, Spring 2002, pp463-484 [Access via Bond Library Databases]
- NotiCen* "Haiti Interim Government's Legitimacy Under Fire", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, 18 March 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- NotiCen* "Touting a Sluggish CAFTA in Guatemala", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, Oct 21, 2004b [Access via Infotrac Database]
- NotiCen* "Another Postponement: Haiti Will Have to Wait for a Legitimate Government", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, 5 January 2006 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- NotiCen* "EL Salvador First to Implement CAFTA, and First to Feel the Heavy Hand of Its New Partner", *NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs*, 52 March 2006 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- OAS "Organizational Structure", Organization of American States Webpages, 2003 [Internet Access via <http://www.oas.org/>]
- OAS News " OAS to Send Special Missions to Haiti", January-February 2002 [Internet Access via <http://www.oas.org/>]
- OAS "Inter-American Agency for Cooperation and Development (IACD) Mission Statement", OAS Webpage, 2005 [Internet Access via <http://www.oas.org/>]

- OAS "Homepage and Member States", OAS Webpage, 2005b [Internet Access via <http://www.oas.org/>]
- ORENSTEIN, Catherine "Second-Hand Democracy: Human Rights Workers in Haiti", *Tikkun*, July-August 1998 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- O'SULLIVAN, John " Bush's Latin Beat: A Vision, But a Faulty One", *National Review*, July 23, 2001 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- PEREIRA, Lia Valls "Towards the Common Market of the South: Mercosur's Origins, Evolution, and Challenges", in ROETT, Riordan (ed.) *Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp7-23
- PETRAS, James "Latin America at the End of the Millennium", *Monthly Review*, July-August 1999 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- QUIRK, Robert E. *Fidel Castro*, N.Y., W.W. Norton, 1993
- RICKER, Tom " Competition or massacre? Central American farmers' dismal prospects under CAFTA", *Multinational Monitor*, 25 no. 4, April 2004, pp9-13 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- ROETT, Riordan (ed.) *Mercosur: Regional Integration, World Markets*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999
- ROSENBERG, Robin L. "The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistence, Or Integration of Forces for Multilateralism?", *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43 no. 1, Spring 2001, pp79-101 [Access via Proquest Database]
- SADER, Emir "Latin America: A Critical Year for the Left", *Le Monde diplomatique*, February 2003 [Internet Access via <http://MondeDiplo.com/>]
- SANCHEZ, Enrique "Latin America: Shifting to New Paradigms", *Business Economics*, July 1999 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- SANTANDER, Sebastian " EU-MERCOSUR interregionalism: facing up to the South American crisis and the emerging free trade area of the Americas", 7 no. 4, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Winter 2002, pp491-504 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- SCHAEFFER-DUFFY, Claire "Storm of Protest Greets Trade Accord", *National Catholic Reporter*, May 4, 2001 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
- SHAMSIE, Yasmine "Engaging with Civil Society: Lessons from the OAS, FTAA, and the Summit of Americas", Ottawa, The North-South Institute, 2000 [Internet Access via [http://www.summit-americas.org/Summit-Papers/SummitPapers\(rev\)eng.htm](http://www.summit-americas.org/Summit-Papers/SummitPapers(rev)eng.htm)]
- SISSELL, Kara "South America - Mercosur Trade: A Delicate Dance", *Chemical Week*, 163 no. 40, 31 October 2001, pp18-19 [Internet Access to Proquest via BU Library Databases]
- SISSELL, Kara " U.S. floats proposal to restart FTAA", *Chemical Week*, Feb 19, 2003, 165 no. 7 p13 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- SKIDMORE, Thomas E. & SMITH, Peter H. *Modern Latin America*, Oxford, OUP, 2000

- STREETEN, Paul "Integration, Interdependence, and Globalization", *Finance and Development*, 38 no. 2, June 2001 [Internet Access via <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/streeten.htm>]
- TULCHIN, Joseph S. & ESPACH, Ralph H. (eds.) *Latin America in the New International System*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2001
- UPI "Brazil's Lula slams U.S. and FTAA", *United Press International*, Sept 25, 2002 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- UPI "Analysis: Paraguay Investigates Corruption", *United Press International*, March 13, 2004a [Access via Infotrac Database]
- US News Wire "IberoAmerican Participants Urge the Institutionalization of the Inter-American Economic Council", November 24, 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- VÉLIZ, Claudio *The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994
- WILENTZ, Amy "Coup in Haiti", *The Nation*, 22 March 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
- WILLIAMSON, Edwin *The Penguin History of Latin America*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992
- Xinhua "OAS Analyses Inter-American Anti-Corruption Convention", *Xinhua News Agency*, 5 June 2002a [Access via Ebsco Database]
- Xinhua "OAS Approves Anti-Terrorism Convention", *Xinhua News Agency* 5 June 2002b [Access via Ebsco Database]
- Xinhua " US promises progress in FTAA negotiations with Brazil", *Xinhua News Agency*, Feb 28, 2003a [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Xinhua " Chile proposes 73 percent drop in FTAA tariffs ", *Xinhua News Agency*, Feb 14, 2003b [Access via Infotrac Database]
- Xinhua "Mercosur, EU to resume negotiations on FTA", *Finance CustomWire*, Mar 06, 2004a [Access via Ebsco Database]
- Xinhua " EU, Mercosur set up commission for free trade talks", *Xinhua News Agency*, Nov 24, 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
-

Comentarios y sugerencias a vake_diplomatic@mexicodiplomatico.org